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CROSSING THE INNOVATION DIVIDE
Doris Estelle Long*
While intellectual property has long been perceived as a method for
protecting, and ultimately valuing, innovation, it is an imperfect measure. With its
traditional bias in favor of innovation as delimited by Western views of
individuality and technological progress, intellectual property is not only an
imperfect measure, but also one that has contributed to the undervaluing of nonWestern innovation and creativity. This undervaluationhas denied developing and
least-developed countries a right of compensation for local innovation, which has
contributed to the continuing imbalance in economic development. Recognizing a
broaderdefinition of compensable innovation that includes non-Western concepts,
including innovation and creativity based on so-called traditional knowledge,
would allow the holders of such knowledge to participateas partners in emerging
knowledge-based industries. Ultimately, protection of "generational"innovation
could provide a strong tool for wealth transfer that serves to make developing
nations active participants in their own sustainable development. More
significantly, establishinga rationalsystem of protection for traditionalknowledge
would bring social justice back into the issue of innovation protection. As we
remake innovation systems in response to the changes demanded by the global
digital marketplace, rationalprotection for traditionalknowledge must be a part of
that change if we are to achieve equitable, sustainablevalues for innovative activity
in the twenty-first century.

* Professor and Chair of the Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Privacy Group, The
John Marshall Law School. I would like to thank the organizers and participants of the Temple Law
Review Symposium on Law Without Borders: Current Legal Challenges Around the Globe for their
comments, which helped strengthen this Article and the ideas contained therein. I would also like to
thank the various sponsors and participants at the following workshops and conferences where diverse
aspects of the issues addressed in this Article were discussed, including: the Yale Law School Access to
Knowledge Conference; the third annual Intellectual Property & Communications Law Program
Symposium at Michigan State University College of Law; the ninth annual Conference of the
Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities, at Syracuse University College of Law;
the Conference on Creative Processes and the Public Domain, at The John Marshall Law School; the
inaugural meeting of the Working Group on Property, Citizenship, and Social Entrepreneurism; and
the Conference on Intellectual Property, Sustainable Development and Endangered Species:
Understanding the Dynamics of the Information Ecosystem, at Michigan State University College of
Law. Finally, I would like to thank my codebater at the Temple Symposium, Professor Peter Yu, for
always challenging me to think more deeply about the issues and potential resolutions to the knotty
problems of traditional knowledge protection. This Article is dedicated to the many people over the
years, and in diverse countries, with whom I have discussed and debated the issue of traditional
knowledge protection. They are far too numerous to name individually but they have each helped to
shape my views, although not necessarily in the manner some of my debaters anticipated. As always,
any errors belong solely to me.

HeinOnline -- 81 Temp. L. Rev. 507 2008

[Vol. 81

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

508

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTR O DU CTIO N .............................................................................................................
I.
THE ECONOMIC REWARDS OF INNOVATION ...............................................
II.
INNOVATION THROUGH NON-WESTERN EYES ...........................................
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND GENERATIONAL INNOVATION ...........
III.

508
515
525
530

IV.

THE

V.

540
INNO V ATIO N ....................................................................................................
HONORING THE UNIQUENESS OF GENERATIONAL INNOVATION ............ 541

IMPACT

OF

THE

FAILURE

TO

VALUE

GENERATIONAL

CON CLU SIO N .................................................................................................................

542

INTRODUCTION

In today's Innovation Era, when labor-based economies are being eschewed
in favor of the more robust development base provided by knowledge-based
industries, 1 one of the most critical divides between the so-called developed and
developing world 2 may be the one regarding the scope, depth, and sustainability

1. See generally DIRECTORATE OF Sci., TECH. AND INDUS., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
AND DEV., SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY OUTLOOK 1996, at 229-56 (providing background
information on knowledge-based economies); U.N. ECON. COMM'N FOR EUR., TOWARDS A
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY: COUNTRY READINESS ASSESSMENT REPORT: CONCEPT, OUTLINE,
BENCHMARKING AND INDICATORS, U.N. Sales No. E.03.II.E.31 (2002) (discussing characteristics and
analysis factors of knowledge-based economies).
2. To a certain extent, the terms "developed" and "developing" are as unsatisfactory as other
terms used to describe the divide between industrially and technologically developed countries
compared with countries which have achieved a measurably lower level of development, including
"First World" and "Third World" and "North" and "South." Admittedly, the terms "developed" and
"developing" lack clear definitions and suffer from being both over- and underinclusive. The term
"developing" also suffers from having a somewhat pejorative connotation vis a vis its "developed"
counterpart. Despite these infirmities, I have chosen to use these terms for two reasons. First, the
terms "developed," "developing," and "least-developed" appear in the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights arts. 65-67, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement]. The term "developing" also appears in Article I of the Appendix to the Berne
Convention, where it is defined "in conformity with the established practice of the General Assembly
of the United Nations." Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works app. 1(1),
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne
Convention]. Sam Ricketson described this definition as "disturbingly vague." SAM RICKETSON, THE
BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 634
(1987). Therefore, these terms have a certain relevance to the present discussion that is not apparent in
the other terms. Second, these terms are no less clear than the other choices, and to a certain extent
reflect international attitudes that add to the unequal treatment of innovation based on the sources of
innovation. For the purposes of this Article, I am including "least-developed countries" within the
term "developing countries" since they share the same general potential for generational innovation
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of commercial and industrial development. This divide is the result of a great
many historical, political, cultural, and geographic factors whose complexity and
causality scholars continue to debate. 3 Yet when seen through the lens of
intellectual property law, the relatively slow economic and industrial
development of certain parts of the world may well be caused, at least in part, by
the reduced economic value given to local innovation.
"Innovation" has become the watchword of the twenty-first century. 4 It is
capabilities and the same general lack of economic and industrial growth. See infra Parts II and III for
a discussion of generational innovation.
3. See infra note 62 for a discussion of theories regarding reasons behind the economic and
industrial success of some societies. See generally JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE
FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (1999) (analyzing geographic factors in industrial development); DAVID
S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS (1998) (analyzing cultural issues impacting
development); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) (analyzing impact of civil society

and ethics on development).
4. Even the briefest analysis of the extent to which "innovation" has become a new catchphrase
for the twenty-first century demonstrates the depth and breadth of its adoption to refer to everything
from new inventions to new web pages. A recently conducted Google search of the term "innovation"
disclosed approximately 115,000,000 entries in English using the term. Innovation - Google Search,
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=innovation&btnG=Google+Search (last visited Feb. 23,
2009). A search for the related term "innovative" disclosed approximately 135,000,000 entries in
English. Innovative - Google Search, http://www.google.comlsearch?hl=en&q=innovative&
btnG=Google+Search (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). A Google Book search disclosed approximately
5,440 books containing the term "innovation" in the title. In Title: Innovation - Google Book Search,
http://books.google.com (search "Advanced Book Search" for "innovation" in "title" field) (last
visited Feb. 23, 2009). The uses disclosed by these searches are almost as varied as the number of
references uncovered. See infra note 5 for examples of the use of the word "innovation." The Western
romance with the concept of innovation is not in itself new. To the contrary, as countless historians
have demonstrated, the pursuit of innovation for the sake of innovation, and a belief in the positive
impact of such innovations, can be dated at least from the Middle Ages. See, e.g., ROBERT FRIEDEL, A
CULTURE OF IMPROVEMENT: TECHNOLOGY AND THE WESTERN MILLENNIUM 155-69 (2007)
(discussing culture of innovation during Middle Ages); DAVID S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND
PROMETHEUS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE
FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT 41 (2d ed. 2003) (describing series of innovations in eighteenth-century

England that gave rise to factory system). Yet innovation seems to have gone beyond the status of a
simple catchphrase or social fad and has instead become a watchword. Like earlier watchwords,
"innovation" has become the password for entrance into the twenty-first century. Not only do books,
articles, and web pages address the concept, the idea of innovation has been a driving force in legal
issues of the twenty-first century; where it previously had played little or no role. Thus, Lawrence
Lessig's seminal book on the impact of copyright in the Digital Age, The Futureof Ideas: The Fate of
the Commons in a Connected World, uses the term "innovation" over eighty-seven times. See
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD

passim (2001). Courts have similarly adopted the concerns of "innovation" in connection with
copyright protection under U.S. law. See, e.g., Digital Commc'ns Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib.
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 462 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (using "innovative" as synonym for expressive originality
for first time in reported U.S. copyright cases); see also Doris Estelle Long, When Worlds Collide: The
Uneasy Convergence of Creativity and Innovation, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
(forthcoming 2008) (discussing appearance of term "innovation" in U.S. copyright cases in the latter
decades of the twentieth century after computer programs had been granted protection under U.S.
copyright laws). Yet the inclusion of innovation concerns in an area of law that previously has largely
focused on creativity demonstrates not simply how dedicated the Western world has become to the
concept of innovation as a watchword, but how problematic this watchword has proven to be. Not only
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used to describe everything from new communication technologies to the latest
web postings.5 Like every good watchword, "innovation" has no precise
6
meaning. It has been defined as everything from "introducing something new"
to "a scientific approach for finding newer better ideas and solutions to
problems, which make life easier and simpler to live."' 7 In the arena of
economics, Joseph Schumpeter defined innovation as "[t]he introduction of a
new good.., a new method of production... [t]he opening of a new market...
[tihe conquest of a new source of supply... [and] [tihe carrying out of the new
organisation of any industry." 8 A report by the Task Force on Science,
Technology and Innovation of the U.N. Millennium Project 9 similarly
emphasizes the entrepreneurial foundations of innovation and its critical role in
helping transform countries from reliance on the exploitation of natural
resources to technological innovation as a basis for development. 10 This
emphasis on technology and entrepreneurship is reflected in the Oslo Manual on
Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data ("Oslo Manual")"

is the term being misused in connection with copyright protection, Long, supra, it has also begun to
lose its meaning. Quite simply, if everything is innovative, then nothing is. One of the premises of this
Article is that the concept of innovation must be given a clearer meaning so that true forms of
innovation-including generational innovation, can be properly protected. In short, the watchword
must be redefined.
5. See, e.g., Press Release, Google, Google Closes Acquisition of YouTube (Nov. 13, 2006),
available at http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/youtube.html (describing services provided by
Google and YouTube as "innovative"); Google Monetizes YouTube - Not User Generated Content,
http://gawdlevelmarketing.blogspot.comt2007/08/google-monetizes-youtube-not-user.html
(Aug. 28,
2007) (discussing Google-YouTube merger in weblog dedicated to "innovative" marketing);
Innovative Blog Hopes to Make YouTube Exciting Again, WEBWIRE.COM, Feb. 9, 2008,
http://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?ald=58814 (using "innovative" to describe new product).
See supra note 4 for further examples.
6. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 701 (3d ed. 1993).
7. Posting of Manoj Sterex to http://answers.yahoo.com/question/?qid=1006031602760
(emphasis added) (responding to "[wlhat is your definition of innovation?").

(2006)

8. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO
PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 66 (Redvers Opie trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 1955) (1934) (discussing five factors of innovation and development). This definition of
innovation was cited with approval by the OECD in the second edition of the Oslo Manual. Org. for
Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD] & Eurostat, Oslo Manual: Proposed Guidelines for Collecting
and Interpreting Technological Innovation Data, at 31-32, OECD Code 921997031E1 (2d ed. Apr. 3,
1997), available at http://213.253.134.43/oecd/pdfslbrowseit/9297031E.PDF [hereinafter Oslo Manual
Second]. The Oslo Manual sets forth an internationally recognized standard for measuring innovation.
The second edition of the Oslo Manual, produced in 1997, focused primarily on the first two categories
of Schumpeter's five-category innovation standard, which it referred to using the term Technological
Product and Process ("TPP") Innovations. The most recent edition of the Oslo Manual was published
in 2005. OECD & Eurostat, Oslo Manual: Guidelinesfor Collecting and InterpretingInnovation Data,
OECD Code 922005111E1 (3d ed. Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://213.253.134.43/oecd/pdfs/
browseit/9205111E.PDF [hereinafter Oslo Manual Third].
9. UN Millennium Project, Task Force on Sci., Tech., and Innovation, Innovation: Applying
Knowledge in Development (2005) (prepared by Calestous Juma & Lee Yee-Cheong), available at
http://www.unmillenniumproject.orgldocuments/Science-complete.pdf [hereinafter STI Report].
10. Id. at 81.
11. Oslo Manual Third, supranote 8, at 147.
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produced by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
The Oslo Manual defines innovation as "the implementation of a new or
significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing
method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace
organisation or external relations."'1 2 In addition to the concept of newness
shared by these varied definitions is a concept of change or evolution. In fact,
3
innovation itself is largely a process of creation and diffusion.'
However defined, innovation 14 lies at the heart of economic and industrial
development; more precisely, successful innovation lies at the heart of such
development.' 5 The complex interplay of factors that leads to successful
innovation is well beyond the scope of this Article. Yet what appears abundantly

12. Id. at 46. One of the aspects clarified in this broader definition of innovation is that this
broader definition recognizes that innovation includes adoption of products, processes, and methods
from others. Compare id. (recognizing innovation as either new development or one significantly
adapted from previous work), with Oslo Manual Second, supra note 8, at 16, 31 (giving more narrow
definition of innovation).
13. See, e.g., Oslo Manual Third, supra note 8, at 31-32 (stating that diffusion is central to
innovation).
14. In other fora I have challenged the presumed equation of innovation with creativity (and vice
versa). For purposes of both encouraging such activities and crafting public policies that provide the
appropriate balance between creator's rights and the public, the issues posed by creativity versus
innovation in my opinion require different analyses. See generally Doris Estelle Long, Dissonant
Harmonization: Limitations on "Cash n' Carry" Creativity, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1163 (2007) [hereinafter
Long, Dissonant Harmonization] (distinguishing concept of innovative creativity from aesthetic
creativity); Doris Estelle Long, Innovating New Connections in Intellectual Property Analysis: A
Review of William van Caenegem's Intellectual Property Law and Innovation, 13 MELBOURNE MEDIA
ARTS & L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (book review) (describing how concepts of innovation and
creativity have been blurred in policy debate). Such differentiation necessarily means that products of
innovation are generally most readily protected, if at all, under patent, industrial design, or trade
secret regimes. Given the addition, however, of such "innovative" works as computer software to the
copyright arena, the question of the scope of protection provided for innovative (as opposed to
creative) works must also include an analysis of copyright doctrines as well. I continue to maintain that
such inclusions help explain much of the alleged overbreadth in protection of which copyright law is
accused since the latter decades of the twentieth century. However, for purposes of analyzing the
undervaluation of indigenous, tradition-based innovation and creativity in connection with its role in
the creation of sustainable economic development, the distinction between the two regimes lacks the
same significance. For this reason, I am using the terms "innovation" and "generational innovation" to
include both innovative and creative products and processes in this Article.
15. The success of a particular innovative act is not capable of easy measurement. Thus, for
example, while studies often cite the number of patents owned by nationals as evidence of innovation,
patents are an inexact measure since some innovation is not covered by patent protection and other
innovation may be covered by multiple patents. See, e.g., OECD, The Measurement of Scientific and
Technological Activities: Using Patent Data as Science and Technology Indicators, at 15-16,
OCDE/GD(94)114 (Jan. 1, 1994), available at http:l/www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/622095942.pdf
(discussing methodological shortcomings of using patents as indicators of innovation). In addition,
while the invention of a particular product may qualify as an innovative act, if the product is not
implemented effectively-such as through successful marketing or diffusion to others in the field-it is
difficult to describe such innovation as successful, at least at this particular stage of its evolution. See,
e.g., Oslo Manual Third, supra note 8, at 59 (discussing success of innovation); WILLIAM VAN
CAENEGEM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND INNOVATION 61 (2007) (noting commercial
worthlessness of majority of patents).
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clear, despite its simplicity, is that successful innovation cannot occur unless, in
fact, innovation occurs. One of the critical factors in encouraging such innovation
is the potential for economic return. 16 I do not mean to suggest that economic
profit is the sole or even the most significant motivating factor behind all
innovation. To the contrary, as the emerging evidence of unpaid-for innovative
collaboration in areas such as computer software and medical research
demonstrates, 17 innovation may be undertaken for reasons that have little to do
with direct economic compensation.' 8 However, in areas that require significant
capital investments in either research and development or safety and
environmental testing (such as in the case of pharmaceuticals), economics
continues to play a critical role.
Even if economics did not play a role in incentivizing innovation, the
economic valuation of innovation plays an undeniable role in creating innovation
enterprises. These enterprises lie at the heart of sustainable development. 19

16. Not even the present day intellectual property system assures any particular level of
economic return on innovation. To the contrary, any such return is determined in part by the market
value accorded the innovation in question. Accordingly, an invention could be extremely beneficial for
society as a whole and yet be granted little value in the marketplace. Fortunately, legal protection for
the products of innovation is not the only source of funding available for the investments in capital and
labor required to support innovation. To the contrary, where innovation is undertaken for socially
beneficial purposes, government grants, charitable funding, nongovernmental organizations, and other
nonprofit organizations continue to play a significant role in such funding efforts. See, e.g., Andrew A.
Toole & Anwar Naseem, Leveraging Public Investments with Private Sector Partnerships:A Review of
the Economics Literature,in STRATEGIES TO LEVERAGE RESEARCH FUNDING: GUIDING DOD's PEER

REVIEWED MEDICAL RESEARCH PROGRAM app. D (Michael McGeary & Kathi E. Hanna eds., 2004)
(discussing diverse public and public private research funding combinations). Several authors have
proposed alternative methods of compensating innovative activities. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 124 (2006) (advocating use of medical prizes to fund critical medical
research); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 127-70 (2003)
(discussing several proposals for establishment of patent prize system).
17. Among the most noteworthy examples are the Open Software Movement and the beginning
steps being taken to create an open source network for pharmaceuticals. See generally Pharmaceutical
Licensing Network, http://www.farmavita.net (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (facilitating communication
and encouraging licensing and technology transfer among pharmaceutical professionals); PhOSCo,
http://www.phosco.eom (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (providing network for pharmaceutical licensing
and business development that allows for offers and demands to be sought and met for new
pharmaceutical technology).
18. Compensation, however, may be achieved in other ways, including the reputational value of
being associated with such projects. See CRISTINA GACEK, STANDARDS AND OPEN SOURCE
SOFrWARE: TWINS, COUSINS, OR JUST NEIGHBOURS? 2 (Sch. Computing Sci., Univ. Newcastle upon

Tyne, Tech. Report Series No. CS-TR-867, 2004), available at http://rogue.ncl.ac.ukl
file-store/trs/867.pdf (suggesting reputational benefit is one reason developers participate in open
source projects); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. IND.
ECON. 197,218 (2002) (analyzing reputational goals that drive open source contributors).
19. See, e.g., STI Report, supra note 9, at 81-82 (discussing flex-fuel technologies). See generally
MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER & ASHFAO KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT LAW:

PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PROSPECTS (2004) (discussing diverse issues implicated in broad area of

sustainable development); U.N. Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Open Training Platform:
Entrepreneurship, Economy and Sustainable Development, http://opentraining.unesco-ci.org/cgibinlpage.cgi?g=Categories%2FEntrepreneurship-economyandsustainable development%2Findex
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Without some commercial value attaching to the creation, distribution, and use
of innovative processes, products, or services, innovation fails as a source of
sustainable development. It is only through the development of commerce as a
result of the perceived economic value of innovative enterprises that local
20
innovation can serve a critical role in the sustainable development of a country.
The undervaluation of local innovation by devaluing what I refer to as
"generational innovation" denies developing and least-developed countries a
right of compensation for a large source of local innovation-utilizing the
generational knowledge and practices of their inhabitants. "Generational
innovation" is quite simply innovation using tradition-based knowledge, works,
and practices. On its face, the term generational (meaning across generations)
innovation appears an oxymoron. Yet the generational collaboration that
tradition-based innovation represents fits within the evolutionary nature of
collaboration once the Western concepts of individuated creativity and timeconstrained uniqueness are removed. 21 As the Oslo Manual acknowledges,
"innovative activities" include novelty determinations that may be based on the
knowledge or use of the innovation by a particular "firm. ' 22 Thus, innovation
includes products, knowledge, and services that are "new to the firm."' 23 This
evolutionary focus on innovation as a measure of novelty along the knowledge
diffusion chain supports "generational innovation" as "innovation" shorn of
24
Western concepts of what protectable "innovation" should look like.
According to the Oslo Manual,
There are two main reasons for using "new to the firm" as the
minimum requirement of an innovation. First, adoption of innovations
is important for the innovation system as a whole. It involves a flow of
knowledge to adopting firms. Furthermore, the learning process in
adopting an innovation can lead to subsequent improvements in the
innovation and to the development of new products, processes and
other innovations. Second, the main impact of innovation on economic
activity stems from the diffusion of initial innovations to other firms.

.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (compiling diverse articles and resources regarding relationship
between sustainable development and entrepreneurship).
20. See STI Report, supra note 9, at 118 (emphasizing role of entrepreneurship in sustainable
development activities); WORLD Bus. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & SNV, PROMOTING SMALL
AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2-6 (2007), available at

http://www.wbcsd.org/web/publications/sme.pdf (illustrating outreach for entrepreneurship and
sustainable development); Maureen Liebl & Tirthankar Roy, Handmade in India: Traditional Craft
Skills in a Changing World, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 53, 57-60 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004) (describing
efforts to commercialize traditional craft skills in India); Frank J. Penna, Monique Thormann & J.
Michael Finger, The Africa Music Project, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra, at 95, 104-08 (describing efforts to
create sustainable cultural industry based on traditional African music and musicians).
21. See infra Part II for a discussion of generational collaboration.
22. Oslo Manual Third, supra note 8, at 18.
23. Id.
24. See infra Part II for a discussion of the removal of Western concepts of protection.
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is captured by covering innovations that are new to the
Diffusion
25
firm.
Just as expanding concepts of innovation have slowly begun to move
innovation analysis away from a single focus on enterprise innovation, so too the
concepts of innovation should continue to expand to capture the innovative
activities involved in tradition-based innovation. To the extent that such
generational innovation does not always create absolutely new products, it
nevertheless increasingly plays a role in the 26diffusion of new products and
processes vis a vis much of the developed world.
One technique for correcting the valuation imbalance for generational
innovation is to establish a viable system of protection for traditional28
knowledge. 27 Such a system may ultimately serve as a tool for wealth transfer.
As holders of generational innovation receive economic value for their
innovations, because they are protected from unauthorized and uncompensated
uses, developing nations will become partners in their own development. Wealth
will be transferred from the developed to the developing world on the basis of
innovation diffusion in a partnership system, and not simply as the result of the
vagaries of technical training or development aid. 29 Re-evaluating the economic
value of generational innovation ultimately has the potential of contributing not
only a more socially just balance in economic and technology transfer costs, but
also one that may endure beyond changing aid cycles.
In Part I, I examine the adverse impact that the Western-based intellectual
property ("IP") system has had on the valuation of generational innovation.

25. Oslo Manual Third, supranote 8, at 18.
26. See infra notes 81 and 144 for discussion of the many forms this diffusion takes, including the
basis for patented inventions based on generational innovation and of the products of biopiracy. See
VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 1-5 (1997) (describing
biopiracy throughout history); Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous
Culture: An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229, 229-40 (1998)
(discussing foreign investment and commodified trade items of eco- and cultural tourism).
27. Cf Doris Estelle Long, Is Fame All There Is?: Beating Global Monopolists at Their Own
Marketing Game, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 25-31, on file with
author) (advocating development of traditional knowledge protection to create strong local marks).
28. Cf MARTIN KHOR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIODIVERSITY AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 16-18 (2002) (containing background analysis of relationship between traditional
knowledge and sustainable development); Namulauulu G.V. Tavana, Traditional Knowledge Is the
Key to Sustainable Development in Samoa: Examples of Ecological, Botanical and Taxonomical
Knowledge, in 3 SAMOAN ENV'T F. 19, 19-26 (2002), www.mnre.gov.ws/documents/forum/2002/4Tavana.pdf (contending Samoan traditional knowledge plays critical role in sustainable development
of natural resources). See generally INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENETIC
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2004) [hereinafter
INDIGENOUS HERITAGE] (describing how intellectual property law can protect rights of indigenous
people to their genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore).
29. See, e.g., Doris Estelle Long, Small States and the Challenge of Intellectual Property
Protection, INT'L L. NEWS, Summer 2004, at 1, 7-8 (noting Article 8 of TRIPS mandates developed
countries provide other nations with technical assistance to facilitate development, but details of
assistance are largely left to discretion of developed countries, and advocating small states develop
training policies based on what would best facilitate their development).
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Focusing on the uniqueness requirements imposed by present IP systems, I
contend that such systems continue to devalue indigenous innovation and deny it
even the ephemeral promise of economic benefits granted innovation that
complies with Western concepts of technological progress and individuated
creativity.
In Part II, I examine the critical roles of generational collaboration and
change on generational innovation. I contrast such elements with Western
concepts of protectable innovation that place indigenous innovation outside
present legal protection regimes.
In Part III, I explore the relationship between generational innovation and
traditional knowledge and examine critical issues that must be addressed in
crafting a traditional knowledge regime that provides useful support for effective
valuation of generational innovation. I provide a list of critical questions that
must be answered and suggest some possible solutions to the current limbo of
domestic and international protection for traditional knowledge.
In Part IV, I examine the impact of the failure to appropriately value
generational innovation. I contend that the devaluation of generational
innovation by present regimes is not only harmful to sustainable development
efforts, but actually reverses the flow of technology transfers from developing
countries to developed ones with no concomitant wealth transfer.
In Part V, I suggest that the uniqueness of generational innovation must be
protected through a system that corrects present misconceptions regarding
traditional knowledge. These misconceptions include devaluation of
generational collaboration, misplaced reliance on authentication systems to
resolve such devaluations, and a failure to address the needs of the diaspora.
I conclude by contending that in our efforts to remake innovation systems
in response to the changes demanded by the global digital marketplace, rational
protection for traditional knowledge must be a part of that change if we are to
achieve equitable, sustainable values for innovative activity in the twenty-first
century.
I.

THE ECONOMIC REWARDS OF INNOVATION

A report by the Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation of the
U.N. Millennium Project emphasizes the progressive nature of innovation and its
critical role in helping developing countries move from their traditional status as
providers of labor and natural resources to a new status as a source of
technology- and knowledge-based goods and services. 30 Yet the current
intellectual property system, with its Western-based concepts of protectable
innovation and creativity, may serve as a significant stumbling block to the
creation of local knowledge-based economies, because it fails to value nonWestern innovative activities.

30. STI Report, supra note 9, at 24.
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Whether or not intellectual property laws may be justified domestically
under theories of natural law, 31 labor protection, 2 or personality defense, 33 on
an international basis, post-TRIPS, 34 the philosophy behind such protection
seems clear. Quite simply, intellectual property is about protecting the products
of innovation as items of commerce.35 It is in this guise as a regime for protecting
innovation perceived to have value on a commercial basis that intellectual
property has become a de facto measure for valuing local innovation. Yet this
measure remains seriously flawed because of its historic failure to accord value
to innovation outside the narrow confines of Western views of technological
progress and individual ingenuity.
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS") is the premier multinational agreement governing the protection of
intellectual property rights of the twenty-first century. Administered by the
World Trade Organization, it has been acceded to by 152 countries. 36 Although
frequently criticized for its strong IP protectionist stance, 37 TRIPS today remains
the single most significant focus regarding the standard for the international
protection of intellectual property rights, including, significantly for this Article,

31. See, e.g., Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV.
65, 77-92 (1997) (discussing allocation of intellectual property rights from Lockean rather than rulebased perspective); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic
Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 417 (1996) (pointing out natural law has been leading
theory for jurisprudence regarding intellectual property law); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural
Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 529-39 (1990) (contending modern
copyright law is based in natural law). See generally Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long, Natural
Law and Intellectual Property, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 39-40 (Anthony
D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds., 1997) (discussing natural law theory with respect to intellectual
property).
32. See Peter Jaszi, Beyond Economics: The Protection of Authorship as a Cultural Value, in
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 31, at 127 (recognizing decision to
protect intellectual property stems from value placed on creative acts required to transform ideas into
products).
33. Id. at 132-34 (discussing protection of author personality).
34. TRIPS, supra note 2. Established in 1994 and administered by the WTO, TRIPS remains one
of the most significant multilateral intellectual property treaties of the twenty-first century. Id.;
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT xvii (Carlos M.

Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
35. Works protected by intellectual property have a long historical relationship with economic
(trade) issues. One of the earliest reported trademarks was found on pottery in Mesopotamia-an
undoubted article of commerce. See generally Doris Estelle Long, "Globalization":A Future Trend or
a Satisfying Mirage?, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 313, 324 (2001). The Bere Convention itself
arose from the concerns of Victor Hugo and others over the lack of sufficient international protection
for their creative endeavors. Id.
36. Understanding the WTO - members, http://www.wto.orglenglishlthewto-e/whatis-e/tif-el
org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
37. See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 165 (2003) (noting developing countries were reluctant to agree to
TRIPS due to its inclusion of IP protections); Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement:
Imperialistic,Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 616 (1996) (denouncing
TRIPS' imposition of "Western intellectual property system").
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copyright and patents. The preamble to TRIPS plainly recognizes that the
philosophy behind the protection of intellectual property on an international
scale is trade utilitarianism. It stresses that the reason behind the treaty was
member countries' "desir[e] to reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade."'38 The treaty itself contains numerous provisions directed
expressly to the market impact of intellectual property protection, including
39
compulsory licensing provisions for patents to meet domestic market needs,
and provisions that permit exceptions to intellectual property protection to
40
combat market abuses.
In reality, while the negotiation of TRIPS under the auspices of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 41 and its subsequent inclusion among the
umbrella agreements under which members of the World Trade Organization
operate,42 are strong evidence of the commercial roots of intellectual property
protection, it is not the first instance of such an intimate relationship between
intellectual property and market economics. To the contrary, the Berne
Convention, 43 which is the foundational international treaty for the protection of
copyrights, 44 was the result of an Authors Union formed by such luminaries as

38. TRIPS, supra note 2, pmbl. (emphasis added).
39. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31.
40. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 40(2) (permitting members to prohibit licensing conditions or
practices that "constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on
competition in the relevant market").
41. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT]. In fact, TRIPS was originally negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round under the
auspices of GATT. See generally Amy S. Dwyer, Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
in 4 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1994) 465, 465-576 (Terence P.

Stewart ed., 1999).
42. These umbrella agreements cover a wide range of topics, including Sanitary and
Phytosanitary measures; Trade in Services, Agriculture, and Textiles; and Technical Barriers to Trade
as well as Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. See generally Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 14, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154
(providing Uruguay Round agreements).
43. Berne Convention, supra note 2.
44. The other significant copyright treaties include TRIPS, the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty, and the Universal Copyright Convention ("UCC"). See
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference all substantive articles of Berne Convention
with exception of Article 6bis, dealing with moral rights); WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 7, Dec. 20,
1996, S.TREATY DOc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65 (clarifying right of authors to control use of
their works in digital environment); Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341,
943 U.N.T.S. 178 (serving largely as counterpoint to Berne Convention for those countries like, United
States, that wanted to retain statutory formalities, such as notice and registration, for copyright
protection, and that wanted to eliminate obligations to protect moral rights under copyright). Since the
accession to the Berne Convention in 1989 by the United States, which was perceived as one of the
strongest supporters of the UCC, the UCC has generally been losing significance internationally. See
Silke von Lewinski, The Role and Future of the Universal Copyright Convention, UNESCO ECOPYRIGHT BULLETIN Oct.-Dec. 2006, at 1-13, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/O0
15/001578/157846e.pdf (noting that although nearly 100 states are contracting parties to the UCC, its
importance has decreased due to adherence to the Berne Convention by the United States and former
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).
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Victor Hugo in part to combat the increasing economic harm to authors from the
45
pirating of their works in foreign countries.
This economic overlay gives both TRIPS and intellectual property more
generally a significant role in the economic development of a country. This role
is not limited to the critical and contested question of the extent to which
intellectual property protection may promote foreign direct investment in a
growing economy.4 6 To the contrary, regardless of which side of this debate you
are on, there is no question that, as the premier legal regime for both
encouraging and protecting creative and innovative works, 47 the IP system has
48
become the default means for measuring the economic value of such works.
Yet the innovative and creative activity that is valued under this system is of a
very precise type. It is innovation and creativity as valued by the Western
European countries that first crafted such protection regimes 49 and were at the
forefront of international efforts in the middle to late nineteenth century to
50
harmonize such regimes on an international basis.

45. See RICKETSON, supra note 2, at 14, 46-49 (outlining different IP laws in eighteenth-century
European countries that led to necessity of Berne Convention); Doris Estelle Long, What if Dickens
Had Succeeded? International Copyright, 'Creative Adaptations' and Ebenezer Scrooge (unpublished
work in progress, on file with author) (describing efforts of Charles Dickens to encourage United
States to provide copyright protection to foreign authors).
46. See generally KAMIL IDRIS, INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY: A POWER TOOL FOR ECONOMIC

GROWTH 33-46 (2003) (describing positive economic impact of strong intellectual property
protection); Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in EncouragingForeign Direct
Investment and Technology Transfer, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS
FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 41, 41-74 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005)

(describing technology transfer and foreign direct investment).
47. Despite the numerous challenges and various other fora in which diverse alterations to the
TRIPS model of protection are being developed, these challenges still use as their initial point of
departure the TRIPS Agreement. While scholars may discuss "regime shifts," see Laurence R. Heifer,
Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 13-18, 53-81 (2004) (describing progression of regime shifts in
developed countries from WIPO to GATT to TRIPS), or question the viability of TRIPS as a
continuing basis for regulating intellectual property in the area of biotechnology, see Amy Kapczynski,
The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J.
804, 835-37 (2008) (noting emergence of group coalitions successfully advocating for changes in
intellectual property laws in many areas, including software and medicine), the reality is that TRIPS
remains a jumping off point for discussion because it has become the de facto standard for comparison
for international IP protection.
48. See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the economic rights
granted creators and innovators under the present intellectual property system.
49. The first reported copyright law was enacted in England in 1709. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (referencing
Statute of Anne as foundation for literary IP rights). The first reported trademark type regulation may
have been enacted in Venice in the Middle Ages. See STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 8-9 (1930) (describing regime of monopolies and executive
privileges in Hanseatic cities during Middle Ages).
50. Multinational treaties governing intellectual property rights were first established in Europe,
including, most notably, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in
1886 and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Designs in 1883. See Daniel J. Gervais,
The Internationalizationof Intellectual Property:New Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New,
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Law is part culture, part politics, and part history. And the history of
intellectual property protection is a history of romantic notions of authorship
and ingenuity. 51 The identifiable single author, painting alone in the garret, has
become the symbolic vision behind present copyright protection systems in
which protection is grounded in the "individual rights" 52 of a single, identifiable
author 53 to control his or her works. Even if patent law is not quite so
54
romantically premised, except perhaps in the obligation to identify the inventor
and in the U.S. practice of granting patent rights to the first to invent (as
opposed to the first to file), 55 it is still based on the Western notion of progress

12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929, 941 (2002) (noting "Paris and Berne
Conventions were negotiated on a trans-Atlantic basis with limited input from other parts of the
world").
51. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 54-55 (1996) (describing basic literary property rights via author
originality in Elizabethan England); Jaszi, supra note 49, at 455-63 (discussing evolution of

"authorship" concept over time and its negative impact on copyright law); Martha Woodmansee, On
the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL
APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 15, 27-28 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994)

(describing legal protection of unique literature to Romantic and Renaissance periods).
52. TRIPS itself recognizes that intellectual property rights are "private rights." TRIPS, supra
note 2, pmbl., cl.
4. Moreover, in incorporating the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention, id.
art. 9(1), TRIPS similarly adopts the reliance on an identifiable copyright author for purposes of
measuring copyright. Not only are all rights granted to the "author" of the work, see, e.g., Berne
Convention, supra note 2, art. 5 (granting authors of literary and artistic works rights bestowed by
their respective domestic legal systems); id. art. 9 (granting authors of literary and artistic works

exclusive rights in authorizing reproduction), but the term of protection granted under both the Berne
Convention and TRIPS are generally measured by the life of the author, see, e.g., id. art. 7(1) (granting
term of protection for author's life plus fifty years after death); TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 9(1)
(incorporating Berne Convention Article 7). But cf Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 7(3)
(granting protection to anonymous works for fifty-year term once work is available to public unless
author voluntarily discloses his identity during that time).
53. Joint authorship is possible under both international and U.S. law. See 17 U.S.C. §201(a)
(2006) (providing authors of joint work are "co-owners of copyright in the work"); TRIPS, supra note
2, art. 9(1) (incorporating Article 7bis of Berne Convention); Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 7bis
(extending term of protection for joint authorships determined by death of last surviving author).
However, even though creative collaboration is encouraged, its protection is still narrowly
circumscribed, requiring that any such collaborative effort fit within the context of individuated
authorship. See infra Part II for an analysis of the limits on indigenous innovation.
54. See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4ter, Mar. 20, 1883, as
revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 24 U.S.T. 2140, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. This provision was subsequently
incorporated into TRIPS. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 2(1) (requiring compliance with numerous articles
of Paris Convention, including article 4ter).

55. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) (2006) (establishing priority of inventorship to first inventor);
id. § 115 (requiring "original and first inventor" to attest to that status in patent application). This
obligation is under increasing attack since the United States is the only country currently to utilize this
system. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 2(b) (as passed by House, Sept.

7, 2007) (replacing first-to-invent system with first-to-file system). Part of the reason for this system
was the narrative of individuality behind significant inventive achievements in early U.S. history. See,
e.g., CLARE PETITT, PATENT INVENTIONS-INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE VICTORIAN NOVEL
2 (2004) (recognizing shared romantic notions of individuated genius in patent and copyright regimes);
SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 11
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through science and technology. While this Western faith in progress through
science is largely perceived to date from the seventeenth century,5 6 technological
57
innovation has been valued since at least the Middle Ages in Western Europe,
and has ultimately led to a culture of innovation that has often been cited as one
of the reasons for the present advanced status in the economic development of
the West. 58 I do not mean to suggest that non-Western cultures did not also
value innovation, including scientific innovation. To the contrary, countries such
as China and India were the sources of numerous scientific advances through the
ages.59 But, unlike the West, neither India nor China established an innovation
valuation system that granted economic exploitation rights to the creators of
such innovations. 60 Nor did either country succeed in establishing until recently
the culture of innovation that lies at the heart of the history of the economic
development of the West. As Robert Friedel acknowledges in his work A
Culture of Improvement: Technology and the Western Millennium,
Over the past thousand years there has developed in the West a
"culture of improvement," an environment in which significant, widely
shared value has come to be attached to technical improvement and
conditions have been cultivated to encourage and sustain the pursuit of
improvement. Related to the value attached to improvement is the

(2005) (tracing romantic origins of inventor genius). If copyright is filled with the romance of the artist
in the garret, then arguably, at least in the United States in its early days, patent is filled with the
romance of the single inventor working in a makeshift lab in the garage. See, e.g., JOHN H. LIENHARD,
How INVENTION BEGINS: ECHOES OF OLD VOICES IN THE RISE OF NEW MACHINES 8 (2006)
(discussing our "seemingly atavistic need to credit one individual for the work of many"). In today's
global, digital environment of high tech collaboration, neither image may be realistic, if they ever
were.
56. See, e.g., RICHARD G. LIPSEY, KENNETH I. CARLAW & CLIFFORD T. BEKAR, ECONOMIC

TRANSFORMATIONS: GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES AND LONG-TERM ECONOMIC GROWTH
232-38 (2005) (suggesting science that developed in fifteenth to seventeenth centuries replaced earlier
intellectual domination of Aristotelian theories and Christianity). This "faith" is largely derived from
the Scientific Revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See generally 2 DONALD
KAGAN ET AL., THE WESTERN HERITAGE 496-503 (4th ed. 1991) (describing scientific innovations
that occurred in seventeenth century).
57. See, e.g., FRIEDEL, supra note 4, at 8 (pointing out rising societal value of innovation via
technological advancement during Middle Ages); LANDES, supra note 4, at 15-22 (discussing
developments during Middle Ages leading to increased economic enterprise).
58. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, THE RISE OF THE WEST: A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN
COMMUNITY 654 (2d ed. 1991) (stating new technologies began to transform West as other cultures
fell behind); NATHAN ROSENBERG & L.E. BIRDZELL, JR., How THE WEST GREW RICH: THE
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRiAL WORLD 3 (1986) (stating past two hundred years

has been unprecedentedly long period of prosperity and examining reasons behind such prosperity).
59. See, e.g., IDRIS, supra note 46, at 11 tbl.1.1 (describing scientific advances achieved in India
during the Moghul Empire when no patent protection existed); ROBERT TEMPLE, THE GENIUS OF
CHINA: 3,000 YEARS OF SCIENCE, DISCOVERY, AND INVENTION 9-10 (1986) (describing diverse
scientific advances in China before Chinese established patent laws).
60. See TEMPLE, supra note 59, at 9-10 (positing that neither Chinese innovators nor their
inheritors effectively claimed their inventions).
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that improvement will indeed occur in most
widespread expectation
61
realms of technology.
Whether or not a property-based rights system such as the one represented
by current intellectual property regimes is necessary to encourage the creation of
innovative works, such a system has undoubtedly played a role in the historical
development of a culture of innovation in the West. By serving as a basis for
property law has been a
valuing such works on an economic basis, intellectual
62
means for encouraging their creation and use.
While scholars may debate the utility of the property-based nature of rights
granted under current IP regimes, 63 or the scope of exceptions for intellectual
property protection in today's digital environment, 64 the basic notion of
individuated creativity remains at the core of Western intellectual property
61. FRIEDEL, supra note 4, at 6.
62. See, e.g., LIPSEY supra note 56, at 261 (including improved intellectual property laws as
reason for Western economic advances); see also HISAMITSU ARAI, WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE IN WEALTH CREATION 15,
73-78 (1999) (describing use by Japan of strong patent law protection to create its own technology
industry); PAT CHOATE, HOT PROPERTY: THE STEALING OF IDEAS IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
105 (2005) (describing Germany's use of patent laws to maintain global monopoly in chemical industry
during early decades of twentieth century). The promise of an economic return for innovative acts may
be even more critical for inventions that impact health, safety, or the environment. The high cost of
much innovative activity, particularly in the critical areas of health, safety, and agriculture, where
innovations must be tested for safety and environmental harm, means that some form of economic
support for such research must be provided. While government grants, nonprofit institutions,
nongovernmental organizations, and other public and private charitable sources may exist to support
such research, the patent laws were developed to provide an alternative to these sources. See, e.g., VAN
CAENEGEM, supra note 15, at 4 (stating intellectual property rights help protect against market risk).
Patent laws do not require that the only sources for funding for research that results in patentable
inventions are derived from the economic benefits secured by such laws. Similarly, their existence does
not prevent other funding sources beyond those secured by the exploitation of the patent grant. In an
age where global pandemics such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria continue to kill millions,
removing the alternative sources of funding provided by the economic exploitation rights granted
under patent laws seems a foolhardy approach at best. I do not mean to suggest that these exploitation
rights should not be balanced against the needs of developing and least-developed countries in
providing essential medicines, such as the potential solution provided under Article 31bis of the
Annex to the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement. Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement,
Annex to the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement art. 31bis, WT/L/641 (Dec. 6, 2005).
However, efforts to eliminate completely the potential research funding benefits of patents are ill
founded. To meet many of the critical health and safety challenges we need both "open source"
funding equivalents as well as patents to assure adequate sources of funding. See supra note 17 for
examples of "open source" funding equivalents.
63. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1797 (2000) (describing negative effects of
property-rights-based system); Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate
Local Innovation in Developing Countries:Application to TraditionalKnowledge, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME 337, 365 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS] (suggesting compensatory liability principles could resolve problems of propertyrights based system).
64. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 180-82 (comparing exceptions to copyrights in physical world in
relation to cyberspace counterparts).

HeinOnline -- 81 Temp. L. Rev. 521 2008

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

systems. 65 Even those who suggest a reduction in the scope or type of protection
afforded intellectual property rights in the Digital Age do not suggest a complete
eradication of such protections. 66 But consider what this Western focus on
individuality and technology-based progress says about creative and innovative
activities that do not readily fit within this model. Are works that are the product
of collaboration less valuable than single-authored works? Is only innovation
based on the latest scientific and technological advances worthy of compensation
or does economic value also reside in innovation based on practices that have
been perfected through generations of use?
Under present intellectual property regimes, generational knowledge and
practices cannot generally be protected. Copyright requires "originality."
'67
Whether such originality is demonstrated through a "modicum of creativity,
through evidence of "intellectual creations, '68 or by "skill, labour and
judgment, '69 Morning Star Poles, weavings, and other works of generational
creativity generally lack such "originality" because they reproduce the patterns
and expressions that other generations have created. At best, works of
generational creativity may be granted a "thin copyright," sufficient only to
protect modifications to tradition-based expressions against unauthorized
70
identical duplications.

65. I do not mean to suggest that recognition of individual authorship is a Western construct. To
the contrary, numerous cultures value the identification of authorship. Thus, for example, while
copyright protection did not exist in India when the Bhagavad Gita or the Mahabharatawere being
written, the authors of such works were credited. See, e.g., KRISHNA DHARMA, MAHABHARATA: THE
GREATEST SPIRITUAL EPIC OF ALL TIME 15 (1999) (crediting Mahabharatato Vyasadeva); see also
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 193 n.ll (2001) (noting that authorial credit was given in India,

even in absence of copyright). Similarly, while no copyright existed in China, the writings of Confucius
were still accredited to Confucius. See Burton Watson, Introduction to THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS
6 (Burton Watson trans., 2007) (attributing up to twenty ancient sections or "Books" to Confucius in
Chinese literary tradition). More recently, during the opening months of the National Museum of the
American Indian in Washington, D.C. I observed that each exhibit contains information regarding the
"authors" (my term, not theirs) of the exhibits in question.
66. Thus, for example, Lawrence Lessig, who has routinely criticized the scope of protection for
copyright in the Digital Age, insists that he does not support the eradication of all such protection. See,
e.g., LESSIG, supra note 4, at 107-08 (commenting on benefits of copyright in creative process).
Similarly, those who criticize the extension of patent protection to software innovations do not suggest
that the patent system itself should be abolished. See, e.g., James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., March 12, 2000, at 44 (arguing much of patent system's value lies in disclosure of technologies
that might otherwise be hoarded as trade secrets). Even Jerome Reichman, who suggests that a
property-based system should be eschewed in favor of one based on product liability rules, does not
advocate the elimination of some form of economic reward for creators, merely a change in the basis
on which such rewards are enforced. See Reichman & Lewis, supra note 63, at 345 (acknowledging
property-rights-based system has benefits).

67. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (providing U.S.
standard for originality under domestic copyright law).
68. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 10(2) (providing TRIPS originality standard for databases).
69. Interlego A.G. v. Tyco Industries Inc., (1988) 3 All E.R. 949, 971 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
H.K.) (promulgating test of originality under British law).
70. See, e.g., Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 8, 11 n.4, 12-13, 19 (2005) (stating
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Indigenous inventions fare no better. Protection for inventions under patent
law requires "novelty" and "nonobviousness." 71 While technology-based
advances generally meet the high standard of uniqueness required under patents,
tradition-based innovations automatically fail because they have been in use too
long to be novel. Thus, generational innovations such as the use of Neem seed as
a fertilizer or of turmeric to clean wounds cannot be protected under patent,
while the application of technology to such innovations, in the form of extraction
of such extractions,
processes to obtain the active ingredient, and the results
72
generally demonstrate sufficient novelty for protection.
Ultimately, the uniqueness 73 requirements under copyright and patent law
serve to place the products of tradition-based innovation beyond legal
protection. 74 Instead, such innovation is placed into the public domain, where

that buildings based on Pueblo Revival style granted thin copyright requiring "supersubstantial
similarity"--or nearly verbatim copying-for protection); accord Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of
Australia (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481, 11 19-21 (recognizing Morning Star Pole as subject to copyright
protection, ironically for purposes of denying artist right to control use of his work in accordance with
tribal customs).
71. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27(1) (permitting patent protection for inventions "in all fields
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application"). The tripartite test under Article 27 of TRIPS is met by the U.S. standards for
patentability of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006) (establishing
U.S. patentability standard); TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27 n.5 (providing "terms 'inventive step' and
,capable of industrial application' may be deemed ... to be synonymous with . . . 'non-obvious' and
'useful' respectively" for purposes of patentability under Article 27 of TRIPS).
72. See U.S. Patent No. 5,405,612 (filed Dec. 2, 1993) (issued Apr. 11, 1995) (covering
applications of Neem seed as insecticide); U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993) (issued Mar.
28, 1995) (revoked Apr. 21, 1998) (covering use of turmeric for wound treatment). Interestingly, the
patent granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office for turmeric was ultimately revoked
on the basis of a re-examination request filed by the Indian Center for Scientific and Industrial
Research due in part to prior art in Sanskrit texts concerning such uses. See Reexamination Request
No. 90/004.433, Reexamination Certificate B1 (3500th), (filed Oct. 28, 1996) (issued Apr. 21, 1998)
(canceling all claims in original patent). For a discussion of the Neem seed and turmeric controversies,
among others, regarding patents and traditional knowledge, see Philip Schuler, Biopiracy and
Commercialization of EthnobotanicalKnowledge, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE, supra note 20, at
159, 161-69.
73. I do not mean to suggest that the standard of uniqueness for patents and copyrights should be
the same. To the contrary, because the goals of patent and copyright law are distinctly different-the
first to encourage innovation, the second to encourage creativity, see, e.g., Long, Dissonant
Harmonization,supra note 14, at 1205 (urging investigation into aesthetic and innovative creativity to
better tailor copyright and patent laws to serve their distinctive goals)-the uniqueness standards
should appropriately differ. However, as compared to tradition-based works, this uniqueness
requirement has been used to impose a standard that virtually assures that generational innovation
will remain unprotected.
74. See, e.g., WIPO International Forum on "Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge:
Our Identity, Our Future," Jan. 21-22, 2002, The Attempts to Protect Expressions of Folklore and
Traditional Knowledge, 1 17, WIPO/IPTK/MCT/02/INF.5 (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter WIPO Forum]
(detailing differences between idea of author as it relates to traditional folklore and modem notion of
artistic work); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1331, 1350-51 (2004) (asserting TRIPS has left traditional knowledge in global commons while
protecting intellectual products of developed world); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of
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innovators lose any right of control over their works. 75 This loss of control is
critical to the economic valuation of innovative activities. Without the legal right
to control the use of one's creative or innovative work, 76 or at a minimum to be
compensated for such uses under a liability rule,77 tradition-based innovation
cannot be used to generate wealth by their holders. At its core, intellectual
property protection values innovation by granting the producers of innovative
and creative works the economic benefits of their efforts. Through the grant of
exclusive rights to control the use of the patented invention 78 or the copyrighted
work, 79 the law grants innovators the ability to seek compensation for the
exploitation of their works. Such a system does not assure that socially useful
innovation will always achieve an economic reward. To the contrary, only those
works that are perceived as having value in the marketplace, either through
Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 233, 238 (2001) (recognizing mistaken belief that
knowledge of traditional peoples is in public domain and therefore can be used freely).
75. Dutfield, supra note 74, at 238; see also Doris Estelle Long, Curtailing the Imperialism of the
Public Domain or Changing the Rules of the Great Game for the Intellectual Property Empire 20
(May 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter Long, Curtailing
Imperialism] (contending, despite apparent agreement to place traditional knowledge in public
domain, such domain is not monolithic state requiring such heavy-handed measures to assure
adequate access to information). For a comprehensive overview of the literature regarding the public
domain, see Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 786-813
(2006).
76. It is possible that the ability to control the use of one's work might be achieved through other
means, including contractual agreements. Schuler, supra note 72, at 177-78. Where, however, an
innovation falls outside the scope of patent protection, it is highly unlikely that a third party would
agree by contract to pay for an invention it could use without compensation if it so chooses. The only
significant exception might be for those inventions where secret knowledge regarding the innovation,
such as know-how or show-how, is sought to enhance the use of public domain innovations.
77. See Reichman, supra note 63, at 1777 (suggesting liability principles should be basis for
innovation law). I am not suggesting that product liability rules should be used to protect generational
innovation. I believe such rules might prove useful in areas where the holder of the generational
innovation is willing to license third party use and where the only issue is the amount of compensation
for such use. Where, however, there are concerns over deculturizing uses or other uses beyond
compensation, liability rules are problematic. See Long, Dissonant Harmonization, supra note 14, at
1184 (recognizing possibility of multiple motivations, including economic gain, for aesthetic creativity).
78. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 28(1)(a) (stating exclusive rights include right to prohibit third
parties from making, using, importing, or selling patented invention without authorization of patent
holder).
79. In reality, copyright owners are not granted the right to control the use of their works. Unlike
patents, where holders are granted the right to prohibit the unauthorized use of their invention, id.,
copyright owners can only control the public distribution of their works (whether by reproduction,
performance, transmission, or communication), see, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 44, art.
6(1) (granting authors exclusive right to distribute works to public through sale or otherwise); Berne
Convention, supra note 2, arts. 9, 11, 12 (granting rights of reproduction, performance, and
adaptation). Once a work has been made publicly accessible, the copyright holder cannot control a
third party's ability to actually use the work, including reading text or listening to music in private.
Whether such permitted uses can be controlled through the application of technological protection
measures remains one of the most critical issues in the development of copyright standards in the
Digital Age. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1182-84 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (denying protection for universal garage door openers under Digital Millennium Copyright
Act for failure to prove unauthorized use of copyrighted software).
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popularity (for copyrighted works) or industrial adoption (for patents), will
generally attract investment capital. Nevertheless, lacking the value of
uniqueness defined by Western concepts of legal protection for innovation, most
generational innovation cannot even count on this ephemeral promise of
economic return.
II.

INNOVATION THROUGH NON-WESTERN EYES

Western innovation systems impose burdens on legal protection that
exclude the innovative acts of those who do not share the same views regarding
individuated, technologically based progress as the sole source of economically
valuable innovation. As the WIPO report on The Attempts to Protect
Expressions of Folklore and Traditional Knowledge so succinctly stated,
It seems that copyright law may not be the right, or certainly the
only, means for protecting expressions of folklore. This is because,
whereas an expression of folklore is the result of an impersonal,
continuous and slow process of creative activity exercised in a given
community by consecutive imitation, works protected by copyright
must, traditionally, bear a mark of individual originality.80
It is this value for the generational passage of knowledge and practices that
lies at the heart of non-Western, indigenous creativity and innovation. Thus, for
example, the Kuna Yala of the San Blas Islands in Panama use elaborate
embroidery designs consisting of a reverse appliqu6 pattern historically used on
their dresses and blouses. 81 These designs, generically referred to as "molas,"
traditionally are based on geometric patterns that may represent characters in
traditional stories or myths. 82 Yet within the transmission of this tradition-based
practice is room for the change that affects all traditions and culture. Thus, for
purposes of commercialization, the Kuna Yala have begun to create new
patterns to meet the market desires of consumers who seek bolder colors or
more recognizable pattern designs such as fish and other shapes. 83 This change in
the face of collisions with other cultures demonstrates an often-forgotten aspect
of generational innovation: it is not static.84 It is not a reification of culture for
80. WIPO Forum, supra note 74, 1 17.
81. See generally Mar Lyn Salvador, Kuna Women's Arts: Molas, Meaning, and Markets, in
CRAFTING GENDER: WOMEN AND FOLK ART IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 47 (Eli Bartra

ed., 2003) (discussing Kuna Yala clothing designs and techniques). For pictures of traditional and
nontraditional mola patterns, see MARICEL E. PRESILLA, MOLA: CUNA LIFE STORIES AND ART 1-35
(1996).
82. Salvador, supra note 81, at 54.
83. Id. I was told by some of the Kuna Yala that they chose to make mola patterns in bright blue
and depicting fairly realistic, but stylized, versions of fish because these designs were very popular with
American tourists. Yet despite the use of new designs, they insisted that the new style molas be
created using the same hand-stitched reversed-appliqu6 techniques that they had used historically for
the more traditional designs that they wore on their clothing. These women also told me they would
never wear one of these new designs themselves because they did not consider them "authentic"
patterns.
84. To the contrary, much generational innovation encapsulates the steady evolution resulting
from contact with other cultures, including those of the external consumer marketplace. See, e.g.,
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reification's sake. At the World Forum on the Protection of Folklore in 1997,
Terri Janke described folklore as a "living and continually evolving tradition....
'8 5
This
Its continued practice is vital to the identity and survival of [its holders].
Such
innovation.
same description could be used to describe all generational
innovation represents a distinctly non-Western focus on social collaboration and
perfection of information through controlled transmission across generations.
These values appear to be in direct opposition to the individuated,
technologically based constructs of progress contained within present intellectual
property system.
Under present copyright and patent regimes, protected creative and
86
innovative works must not only bear the necessary hallmarks of uniqueness,
they must also be the product of individuated creatorship.8 7 While copyright88
recognizes the concept of joint authorship arising from collaborative efforts,
the terms of such collaboration are often narrowly constrained by time and
activity requirements. Thus, for example, under U.S. copyright law, to qualify as
a joint author, the authors in question must have intended at the beginning to
work together to create a single work. 89 Such intentional collaboration
ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 208-47 (1998) (examining interactions between consumer culture and
indigenous and other groups); CROSS-CULTURAL CONSUMPTION: GLOBAL MARKETS, LOCAL
REALITIES 19-194 (David Howes ed., 1996) (containing diverse articles regarding cross-cultural
impacts); JAN NEDERVEEN PIETERSE, GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE: GLOBAL MtLANGE 41-58
(2004) (discussing impact of globalization on culture, including hybridity).
85. Terri Janke, UNESCO-WIPO World Forum on the Protection of Folklore: Lessons for
Protecting Indigenous Australian Culturaland Intellectual Property, 2 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 405, 407
(1997), quoted with approval in Agnes Lucas-Schloetter, Folklore, in INDIGENOUS HERITAGE, supra
note 28, at 259, 263.
86. See supra notes 67-73 for sources that discuss the various hallmarks of uniqueness.
87. Such individuated creatorship obligations are contained in the need for an identifiable author
under copyright and an identifiable inventor under patent, see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2006)
(reducing period of copyright protection to maximum of 95 years from date of first publication or 120
years from date of creation unless author is identified during her lifetime); 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115 (2006)
(requiring identification of author as part of oath to support valid patent application), in the
specification of intellectual property rights as "private rights," TRIPS, supra note 2, pmbl., cl. 4, and in
the narrow definition of who may share authorial and inventive rights, see infra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text for a discussion regarding collaborative ownership rights.
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (establishing that "[t]he authors of a joint work are co[-]owners of
copyright in the work"); Berme Convention, supra note 2, art. 7bis (dealing with calculation of terms of
protection for "work of joint authorship").
89. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "joint work" as one "prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole" (emphasis added)); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 10(1) (U.K.) (defining
"work of joint authorship" as "a work produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which
the contribution of each author is not distinct from that of the other author or authors"). The
application of domestic copyright law to the question of joint authorship (versus the role of helpful but
unrecognized collaborator, without copyright protection privileges) is extremely complex. Under U.S.
law, for example, there are conflicting opinions regarding the need for each author to make a
copyrightable contribution to the work as a whole. Compare Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227,
1231-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding, in addition to requiring copyrightable contributions, that
collaborator must have been author as well), with Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660-61 (7th Cir.
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necessarily imposes a time constraint on protectable collaborative efforts. Once a
work has been created, "collaboration" becomes "adaptation," which requires
the approval of the original creator.90 Thus, if two individuals work together to
create computer code for a video game, they might qualify as joint authors. If,
however, one person creates the code, and a second individual revises that code,
the second individual is no longer a joint author. To the contrary, he has now
become the creator of a derivative work and must receive the permission of the
first author to create his revision, unless such adaptation qualifies as permissible
fair use. 91 Worse, under present U.S. law, if such time-separated collaborator
does not receive permission, and his collaborative activities are not otherwise
privileged, even if the second putative author has a separate copyright in his own
original contributions to the adapted work, 92 he would be unable to defend his
93
copyrighted adaptations against others' infringing uses.
Collaborative activities under present patent regimes are less constrained
than under copyright. There is no requirement that joint inventors under U.S.
law work together to create a new invention. To the contrary, joint inventorship
under U.S. law exists even if the two do not physically work together or even
make equivalent contributions to the conception of the patented invention, or to
the subject matter of its claims. 94 Even if an individual only contributes to a

2004) (granting joint authorship despite absence of separately copyrightable contribution). Under
U.K. law, not only must the author "'contribute to the production of the work and create something
protected by copyright which finds its way into the finished work,"' their contribution must also be
"significant," and must not be "distinct" from that of the other authors. Thorsten Lauterbach, Joint
Authorship in a Copyright Work Revisited, 27 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 119, 119-20 (2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ray v. Classic FM, (1998) F.S.R. 622, 636 (U.K.)).
90. Even the Berne Convention distinguishes between initial collaboration-which leads to a
work that can be protected-and adaptation. Berne Convention, supra note 2, arts. 7bis, 12. While
initial collaboration may lead to a work of joint authorship, see id. at 7bis (discussing term of
protection for "works of joint authorship"), once such initial collaboration ends, the second-stage
collaborator-the one who collaborates at a time after the creation of the initial "work"-must obtain
the permission of the first author(s) for "adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of their
works," id. art. 12. Translations similarly require the consent of the first-stage collaborator. Id. art.
liter(2); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (granting authors exclusive right "to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work").
91. See 17 U.S.C. §106(2) (granting exclusive right to prepare derivative works to owner of
copyright); Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 12 (granting to first author exclusive right of
adaptation, arrangement, and alterations). The only exception to this general rule requiring
authorization of second-stage collaborators is if the creation of the derived work is permitted under
fair use doctrines, such as in the creation of a parody. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 574-94 (1994) (finding unauthorized parody of copyrighted song to be permissible fair
use).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (recognizing copyright in "derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work").
93. Id. § 103(a) (stating protection for works using pre-existing materials "does not extend to any
part of the work in which such [pre-existing] material has been used unlawfully").
94. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006) (requiring joint inventors to apply for patent jointly and recognizing
joint inventorship even if "(1) they did not physically work together or at the same time, (2) each did
not make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a contribution to the
subject matter of every claim").
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single claim, by conceiving of the patentable element in the claim, she qualifies
as full joint inventor. 95 Like copyrights, patents impose a time constraint on
collaboration. Inventive collaboration must take place before the invention is
conceived of in its totality96 or enters the public domain through prior public
97
activities such as use or publication.
Protected creative and innovative works under Western views of valueadded innovation are not only the product of individuated creation, but their

economic value to such creators is also time-constrained. While authors are
granted rights to the economic exploitation of their works, 98 subject to critical
fair use exceptions, 99 such rights end after a specified period of time. 100 Under

95. See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460-64 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(recognizing joint inventorship status for researcher who only contributed to two claims in a fifty-five
claim patent); Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding joint
inventor need not have contributed to each element of invention or have conceived of entire
invention).
96. See, e.g., Fina Oil, 123 F.3d at 1473-74 (finding joint inventorship requires each inventor
contribute in a significant manner to clear conception of invention).
97. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (listing public acts which cause invention to lose necessary attributes of
novelty or nonobviousness). If an invention lacks patentability due to the absence of novelty or
nonobviousness, then the "collaborator" is free to use it under patent law, but would no longer qualify
as a joint inventor. To the contrary, the rights to any "derivative" invention that she creates would
belong exclusively to her since the creator of the underlying invention would have no rights under
patent to assert an interest in her derivative invention. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92
(1981) (recognizing that although mathematical formula in itself is not patentable, process using
mathematical formulas may be patentable when viewed as whole).
98. See supra note 79 and accompanying text for examples and discussion of how these economic
rights are bounded by the rights to control the distribution, reproduction, performance, and adaptation
of the works. In the Digital Age, such economic exploitation rights extend to use of the work on the
Internet, even though the ability to enforce those rights has proven problematic in the era of peer-topeer file trading and other uses unauthorized by the economic rights holder. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright
Treaty, supra note 44, art. 6 (granting authors exclusive right to make their work available to public);
Fred von Lohmann, Measuringthe DigitalMillennium Copyright Act Against the Darknet: Implications
for the Regulationof Technological Protection Measures,24 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 635, 637-48 (2004)
(discussing diverse problems in protecting copyright on Internet, including darknets and failure of
Digital Millennium Copyright Act to solve such problems). Losses due to digital piracy on the Internet
are virtually incalculable given the untraceable nature of such end-user-based activities. It is
impossible to determine how much loss is caused by online pirate activities because it is impossible to
measure accurately the failure to buy a given work. Cf. OECD, The Economic Impact of
Counterfeiting and Piracy, at 15-16, 21-25, DSTI/IND(2007)9/PART4/REV1 (2007), available at
http:/lwww.oecd.orgldataoecd13/12/38707619.pdf (describing difficulty in determining actual piracy
and counterfeiting figures, and proposing new econometric model). Current estimates by the Motion
Picture Association of America, for example, place losses due to Internet piracy at approximately $2.3
billion for 2006 alone, which can only be a guess at best. L.E.K., THE COST OF MOVIE PIRACY (2006),
www.mpaa.orglleksummaryMPA%20revised.pdf; see also Copy Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at
C8 (reporting widespread sentiment that government is powerless to regulate steadily increasing
amount of bandwidth and users on file-sharing websites).
99. Both the Berne Convention and TRIPS recognize limitations and exceptions to the exclusive
rights granted to copyright authors. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 13 (establishing three-part test for
acceptable limitations and exceptions to copyright); Berne Convention, supra note 2, arts. 9-10bis
(recognizing limited exceptions for reproduction, quotations, teaching, and reporting). In the United
States, exceptions and limitations to rights under copyright are referred to under the general rubric of
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TRIPS this period of time must be at least for the life of the author plus an
additional fifty years. 1 1 Inventors are granted similarly time-constrained rights
to the economic exploitation of their works. Patent protection must last for at
least twenty years from the date of application.1 2 Once this period ends, an
inventor's ability to exercise any form of economic control over the work
similarly ends. Time-sensitive innovation is therefore encouraged, while
innovation grounded in traditions and practices handed down through
10 3
generations receives no economic exploitation rights.
The failure to value tradition-based innovation by granting generational
innovators economic exploitation rights automatically devalues innovative acts
that fall outside Western precepts. While Western precepts of innovation focus

"fair use." See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (establishing four statutory factors for determining fair use of
copyrighted work); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584-85 (1994) (noting that
commercial character of song parody did not create presumption against fair use). Other countries use
the term "fair dealing" to refer to such exceptions. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48,
§§ 29-30, 32-34 (U.K.) (establishing limitations of "fair dealing" for research, criticism, news
reporting, and education). The tests for the two are not the same. See, e.g., Jonathan Band, Google and
Fair Use, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 1, 26-28 (2008) (comparing U.S. fair use and British fair dealing
provisions within context of Google Library Project); see also KIMBERLEE WEATHERALL, INTELL.
PROP. RES. INST. AusTL., FAIR USE, FAIR DEALING: THE COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS REVIEW AND THE
FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS IN AUSTRALIA 4-9 (2005), http://www.ipria.net/
publications/Occasional%20Papers/Occasional%20Paper%203.05.pdf (detailing differences between
"fair dealing" under Australian law and "fair use" under U.S. law). For the most extensive list of
potential fair use exceptions I am aware of, see Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(3), 2001 O.J. (L
167) 10, 17-18, which lists fifteen categorical exceptions that European Union members may adopt to
the exclusive right to authorize the reproduction of protected works.
100. Internationally, such rights end fifty years after the author's death. See TRIPS, supra note 2,
art. 12 (providing protection for minimum period of fifty years from creation or authorized publication
of work where protection of work is not calculated according to life of person and work is not
photographic or work of applied art). However, many countries including the United States currently
extend the period of protection to life plus an additional seventy years. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 302
(stating that under U.S. law term of copyright endures for life of author plus seventy years); Council
Directive 2006/116/EC, art. 1(1), 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12, 13 (directing that EU member states harmonize
protection laws to accord protection for duration of author's life plus seventy years).
101. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 12.
102. Id. art. 33. Interestingly, unlike copyright protection, even countries that are perceived to
favor relatively strong patent protection, such as the United States, have not extended the period of
protection beyond the minimum required twenty year term, excluding extensions for patent pendency
during agency approvals for medical and other health and safety patents. See generally JOHN P.
SINNOTT, WILLIAM JOSEPH COTREAU & JESSICA M. SINNOTT, 2B-2P WORLD PATENT LAW AND
PRACTICE (1997) (providing detailed information about patent laws in United States and abroad).
103. The absence of such rights may not only adversely impact sustainable development, it may
deprive the world of the benefits of indigenous knowledge in the critical areas of health, biodiversity,
and environmental conservation. While the process of generational innovation may be the initial result
of noneconomic impulses, including spiritual and communal "gifting," see, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER,
SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE PLUNDER OF OUR COMMON WEALTH 27-41, 81-82 (2002) (discussing
workings of indigenous gift economies and Western understandings of these economies), as
generational innovators begin to diffuse their innovations through authorized commodification,
economic rights may provide needed funds to involve a larger, presently untapped source for
innovations in this area-indigenous peoples.

HeinOnline -- 81 Temp. L. Rev. 529 2008

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

on technology, time constraints, and individuated creatorship, 104 non-Western
innovation contains no such limitations. 1 5 To the contrary, local or traditionbased innovations do not require the addition of technology, have value across
generations, and are not only the result of collective creation, but are also held
collectively by members of the relevant tribe. 1°6 These differences have led to
devaluation of innovative knowledge "painstakingly generated by distinct
communities over the course of centuries"' 1 7 to such an extent that such
knowledge is often considered "free"' 0 8 or "a happy accident-naturally
occurring wealth that is free for the taking."' 1 9 Despite its critical role in
indigenous innovation, so-called traditional knowledge" 0 remains largely
unprotected and, hence, undervalued.
III.

TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND GENERATIONAL INNOVATION

There is no agreed upon definition for the concepts of "traditional
nl
knowledge" or its recently developed subset "traditional cultural expressions."'
"Traditional knowledge" at its broadest meaning covers a potentially large body
of knowledge and practices, handed down through generations. This includes a
wide variety of spiritual and cultural beliefs and practices, tangible works,
folklore, folk art, folk remedies, and information and techniques regarding the
use and conservation of the surrounding biota (flora and fauna).112 Recognizing

104. See supra notes 68-72, 103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legal and cultural
definitions of innovation.
105. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of non-Western concepts of
innovation.
106. See infra Part III for a detailed discussion of traditional knowledge protection, including the
protection of generational innovation. See RONALD V. BETrIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 12-13 (1996) (discussing communitarian view of
property and culture in Indian and Balinese traditions); Christopher S. Byrne, Chilkat Indian Tribe v.
Johnson and NAGPRA: Have We Finally Recognized Communal Property Rights in Cultural Objects?,
8 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 109, 110-11 (1993) (discussing communitarian view of property in Native
American traditions).
107. BOLLIER, supra note 103, at 81 (describing arguments made by RAFI, Global Trade Watch,
and others who support protection of what Bollier refers to as "cultural knowledge").
108. Id.
109. Id. (referring specifically to Western perceptions of indigenous innovations in agriculture
and medicine).
110. See infra Part III for a discussion of traditional knowledge and the issues surrounding the
scope of its protection as intellectual property.
111. In fact, the necessity for any clear definition is one of the issues still under debate before the
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore ("IGC") of the World Intellectual Property Organization. See WIPO
Intergovernmental Comm. Intell. Prop. and Genetic Res., Traditional Knowledge and Folklore [IGC],
The Protection of TraditionalCultural Expressions/Expressionsof Folklore:Factual Extraction,Annex
7-26, WIPOIGRTKF/IC1214(b) (Jan. 31, 2008) (detailing comments by members and observers on
traditional cultural expressions of folklore and including suggested categories of inclusion).
112. See generally WIPO, Intellectual Property Needs and Expectation of Traditional Knowledge
Holders: WIPO Report on Fact-FindingMissions on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge
(1998-1999), at 25 (Apr. 2001) [hereinafter WIPO, Fact-Finding](discussing items contained in broad
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that separate treatment may be required for works that represent indigenous
expression, such as folklore, folk art, and folk rituals, a subcategory of traditional
knowledge has gradually developed over time using the term "traditional
cultural expressions" ("TCEs").1 13 The present division between traditional
knowledge and TCEs is roughly equivalent to the division between patentprotected inventions and copyright-protected works under intellectual property
11 4

regimes.

No current multilateral treaty establishes a protection regime for traditional
knowledge.11 5 To the contrary, to the extent that international organizations
WIPO definition of traditional knowledge); MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE?

(2003) (discussing conflicts over native culture ranging from ethnobotany to use of images of sacred
animals); CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ISSUES
AND OPTIONS SURROUNDING THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE,

A DISCUSSION

PAPER 3 (2001) (discussing traditional and indigenous knowledge as related to medicine and farming);
Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the
Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 AM. U. L. REV.
769, 779 (1999) (noting folklore, including poetry and dance, is part of traditional knowledge); Doris
Estelle Long, Traditional Knowledge and the Fight for the Public Domain, 5 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 317, 318 (2006) (discussing potentially broad definition of "traditional knowledge"
includes religious beliefs and practices, cultural practices, and folk art, lore, and remedies).
113. See, e.g., WIPO IGC, The Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions/Expressions of
Folklore:Overview of Policy Objectives and Core Principles,11, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/7/3 (Aug. 20, 2004)
[hereinafter TCE 2004 Core Principles] (stating that terms "traditional cultural expressions" and
"expressions of folklore" are used synonymously); Rosemary J. Coombe, Protecting Cultural
Industries to Promote Cultural Diversity: Dilemmas for International Policymaking Posed by the
Recognition of Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 63, at 599, 600
(noting WIPO use of "traditional cultural expressions" in conjunction with "expressions of folklore" in
response to concerns of negative connotation of latter).
114. Traditional knowledge is often used synonymously with the concept of biodiversity to cover
the practices and traditions involving agriculture, flora, fauna, and other biogenetic resources, as
covered by the Convention on Biological Diversity. See Convention on Biological Diversity art. 8(j),
done June 5, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-20 (1993), 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (requiring member countries
to "respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity"); Coombe, supra note 113, at 599-600 (noting term traditional knowledge may
include biological fields). By contrast, the term "traditional cultural expressions" is often used
synonymously with the concepts of folklore and other generational expressive endeavors. See TCE
2004 Core Principles, supra note 113, at 11 (noting use of term "traditional cultural expressions"
synonymously with expressions of folklore). In a relatively recent development, some have begun to
differentiate between "traditional cultural expressions" and "expressions of folklore" ("EOF"). Agnds
Lucas-Schloetter suggests that narrower terms such as folklore may allow for more focused, and
ultimately more successful, protection for various aspects of what she refers to as "traditional culture."
Lucas-Schloetter, supra note 85, at 264. For purposes of this Article, I will use the term "traditional
cultural expressions" to include folklore as well as other forms of expressive creativity. I will also use
the term "traditional knowledge" to include TCEs unless specified to the contrary.
115. Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity comes the closest to recognizing the
need to protect traditional knowledge by requiring Contracting Parties "as far as possible and as
appropriate" and "[s]ubject to [their] national legislation" to
[r]espect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and
local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval
and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage
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have considered the issue, they have often decried protection for traditional
knowledge on the grounds that such protection would harm public access to
information. 116 Part of the difficulty in crafting an acceptable protection regime
for traditional knowledge is the definitional problems posed by such a concept.
Since by its very nature most traditional knowledge does not readily fit within
the contours of existing legal regimes for the protection of innovation,11 7 either
those legal regimes must be changed-a daunting task-or a sui generis system
of protection must be created. 118 This system may borrow from intellectual
property precepts.11 9 But the special nature of traditional knowledge necessarily
requires protection that is uniquely crafted to meet the special needs and
challenges of traditional knowledge holders. While a complete analysis of the
issues and challenges faced in crafting such a scheme is beyond the scope of this
Article, among the critical issues that need to be resolved in creating an effective,
rational traditional knowledge system useful in the effective valuation of
generational innovation are the following:

the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge,
innovations and practices.
Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 114, art. 80). The Convention on Biological Diversity,
however, does not establish any standards for such protection or answer any of the critical questions
regarding the scope of protection to be afforded traditional knowledge. See infra notes 117-143 for a
discussion of issues raised in establishing this scope of protection.
116. See, e.g., Long, Curtailing Imperialism, supra note 75 (manuscript at 20-29) (describing
conflict between protection of traditional knowledge and biodiversity); Long, supra note 112, at 319
(describing conflict between Draft A2K Treaty and protection of traditional knowledge); accord IAN
F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE WTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE

ACCESS TO MEDICINES CONTROVERSY 1-2 (Nov. 5, 2003) (discussing conflict between intellectual
property and access to essential medicines); Laurence R. Heifer, Human Rights and Intellectual
Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 47-49 (2003) (discussing two
approaches to viewing intersection of intellectual property and human rights); Peter K. Yu,
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1039, 1077 (2007) (noting conflicts between human rights of public access with rights of creators).
117. See supra Part II for a discussion of the traditional limits of intellectual property protection.
118. This does not mean, however, that such sui generis systems must necessarily be domestic law
systems. To the contrary, while domestic systems serve as a useful testing ground for future
international standards, unless traditional knowledge is granted the equivalent internationalprotection
for its innovative value as that granted to innovation under traditional intellectual property regimes,
then generational innovation will remain undervalued. See generally Lucas-Schloetter, supra note 85
(discussing existing protections as well as need for additional protections of folklore).
119. For example, some of the precepts for the protection of TCEs in tangible form, such as the
right to authorize public reproduction, distribution, or adaptation, might be based on copyright
authorization principles. These principles, however, would have to be modified to take into
consideration the special issues that arise from the use of protected TCEs, including the concern over
deculturized modifications. See, e.g., David Howes, Cultural Appropriation and Resistance in the
American Southwest: Decommodifying "Indianness," in CROSS-CULTURAL CONSUMPTION: GLOBAL
MARKETS, LOCAL REALrIIEs 138, 142-144 (David Howes ed., 1992) (examining adverse impact on
Hopi culture and religion of inappropriate use of Kachina imagery in Marvel comic book); Doris
Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property
Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229, 243-46 (1998) (discussing problem of deculturizing
uses of traditional knowledge).
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1. What is the definition of the scope of practices, traditions, and works for
which protection may be sought? Should protection be limited to tangible works
(similar to the protection provided for copyrightable expression)? Or should
intangible practices and beliefs be capable of some form of exclusive
appropriation?1 20 Should protected knowledge be limited to knowledge held by
indigenous groups, or should it include all types of culturally attributable
knowledge, including that held by immigrant groups within a country? Most
groups that have examined the issue have focused on indigenous groups as the
source of traditional knowledge, 2122 yet culturally attributable knowledge is not
necessarily limited to such groups.
2. What rights should be granted to the holders of protected traditional
knowledge? Should property-based rights be granted or should equitable
compensation for the authorized use of such knowledge be sufficient? 123 The
Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries, one of the earliest
international models for the protection of traditional knowledge, 124 suggested
the use of a "domaine public" system requiring compensation for use of "works
of national folklore."' 125 Many countries that have adopted domestic laws

120. Establishing the scope of "traditional knowledge" can involve some complexity. See, e.g.,
WIPO, Fact-Finding, supra note 112, at 25 (containing wide-ranging descriptions of traditional
knowledge including spiritual beliefs); BROWN, supra note 112, at 2 (describing indigenous groups'
claims to kangaroo as sacred animal).
121. See, e.g., WIPO Fact-Finding, supra note 112, at 23 (noting that traditional knowledge
includes but is not limited to knowledge held by indigenous peoples); BROWN, supra note 112, at 9-10
(noting protection efforts focus on indigenous cultures); Long, supra note 112, at 318 (defining
traditional knowledge as broadly covering "knowledge and practices . . . handed down through
generations," including spiritual and cultural beliefs and folklore).
122. See, e.g., WIPO International Forum on "Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge:
Our Identity, Our Future," Jan. 21-22, 2002, The Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Including
12, WIPO/IPTK/MCr/02/INF.4 (Nov. 2001) (describing indigenous
Expressions of Folklore,
knowledge as "subset of traditional knowledge"); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional
Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 162-63 (2006) (describing lack of protection for "local knowledge,"
which includes indigenous knowledge).
123. See supra note 78-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of author's control and
compensation for patented and copyrighted works. Many sui generis regimes that provide protection
for the use of traditional knowledge relating to biodiversity concerns require that "equitable benefits"
be provided to the relevant group. See, e.g., Biodiversity Law, No. 7788, art. 63 (Republic of Costa
Rica) (requiring "equitable distribution of benefits" for access to biogenetic resources); WIPO IGC,
Genetic Resources: Draft Intellectual Property Guidelinesfor Access and Equitable Benefit-Sharing,
15, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/7/9 (July 30, 2004) (discussing inclusion of benefit-sharing provisions in
international agreements); Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Bonn Guidelines on
Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of Their
Utilization, 1 46-48 (2002) (discussing type, timing, and distribution of monetary and nonmonetary
benefits).
124. The Tunis Model Law was adopted in 1976, and created with the joint assistance of WIPO
and UNESCO. Lucas-Schloetter, supra note 85, at 340.
125. UNESCO & WIPO, Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries, § 6 (1976)
(describing protection of "works of national folklore") [hereinafter Tunis Model Law]; see also id. § 17
(requiring payment to appropriate authority based on percentage of receipts from use of work,
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governing the use of traditional knowledge (as opposed to TCEs) have similarly
imposed compensation obligations, often in the form of equitable benefit sharing
for the commercial uses of indigenous knowledge. 126 By contrast, domestic laws
under domestic laws,
have often subjected TCEs to property-type protection
127
laws.
copyright
domestic
under
protection
including
3. Who should be defined as the holder of protected traditional knowledge?
Many indigenous groups consider traditional knowledge, including TCEs, to
belong to the group as a collective whole.' 28 Who speaks for the group when
there is no organized governance structure to hold such rights? Many early
suggestions for the treatment of traditional knowledge granted such rights to the
government as a default authority. 129 Yet such authorities may lack both suitable
knowledge of tribal practices to determine authorization issues and a sufficient
desire to assure that compensation for authorized uses is provided to the holders
of the knowledge. 130 Due to history, politics, or even tribal expulsion, members
of an indigenous group may be divided to such an extent that they may inhabit
different countries. 131 Thus, for example the Iroquois now occupy both the

including national folklore works). For a brief discussion of the history and effect of the Tunis Model
Law, see Lucas-Schloetter, supra note 85, at 340-42.
126. See generally WIPO IGC, Consolidated Survey of Intellectual Property Protection of
Traditional Knowledge, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/7 (Apr. 4, 2003) (detailing diverse protection regimes);
Greg Young-Ing, Intellectual Property Rights, Legislated Protection, Sui Generis Models and Ethical
Access in the Transformation of Indigenous Traditional Knowledge (Oct. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D
thesis, University of British Columbia), available at http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00009591 (detailing
diverse domestic regimes which require sharing of equitable benefits).
127. See, e.g., Lucas-Schloetter, supranote 85, at 266-340 (detailing diverse countries that protect
folklore, including those that do so by granting copyright protection).
128. See, e.g., Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481, 4 (noting clan is
traditional owner and manager of rights of Morning Star Pole); see also Matthias Leistner, Traditional
Knowledge, in INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 49, 57
(noting traditional knowledge is owned collectively); Long, supra note 112, at 324 (noting traditional
knowledge belongs to group as whole); Silke von Lewinski, Introduction to INDIGENOUS HERITAGE
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 1, 3 (noting concept of individual property is alien to
indigenous peoples).
129. See, e.g., Tunis Model Law, supra note 125, commentary to § 6 (providing economic and
moral rights in "works of national folklore" shall be exercised "by the competent national authority
empowered to represent the people that originated them" (emphasis added)); Lucas-Schloetter, supra
note 85, at 288 (listing countries that grant authorizing authority for use of folklore to national
copyright bureaus).
130. Among the critical issues that require the intimate knowledge that only members of the
relevant group possess are considerations of sacredness and deculturizing uses. See, e.g., BOLLIER,
supra note 103, at 81-82 (discussing view of many communities that land and life are sacred and not to
be individually owned); see also Angela R. Riley, "StraightStealing": Towards an Indigenous System of
CulturalProperty Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 90 (2005) (detailing critical role of indigenous
peoples in crafting appropriate protection regimes for their traditional knowledge).
131. See, e.g., UNESCO, Literacyfor Special Target Groups: Indigenous Peoples, at 3, U.N. Doc.
2006IED/EFA/MRTIPI/40 (Apr. 2005) (prepared by Ulrike Hanemann), available at
http:llunesdoc.unesco.orgimages/OO14/001460/146004e.pdf (noting existence of numerous indigenous
groups across national boundaries).

HeinOnline -- 81 Temp. L. Rev. 534 2008

20081

CROSSING THE INNOVATION DIVIDE

United States and Canada. 132 Which group should have the right to authorize use
of shared knowledge or receive compensation for its authorized use? What
happens if there is a conflict between two previously associated groups? How
should such a conflict be resolved? 133 Given the critical nature that traditional
knowledge plays in the identity and even cultural survival of a particular
indigenous group, 34 subjecting conflict resolutions to simple court actions seems
in direct contrast to the sensitive cultural issues underlying any such conflict.
4. What rights should those who have left the tribe be allowed to exercise in
connection with traditional knowledge? The diaspora may exist by choice, as
with those who chose to leave the tribal group to emigrate elsewhere, or by
expulsion, as when one has violated tribal laws and subsequently been denied the
benefits of tribal membership. 135 Should the reason for removal impact the rights
permitted to the diaspora? Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights recognizes that "[e]veryone has the right freely to participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits."' 36 Whether this right represents a fundamental
human right, and is therefore governed by such norms, remains unclear.' 37 Even
more difficult is the problem of the extent to which someone has a right to
participate in one's culture regardless of one's physical location on tribal lands.
The question of the relationship between traditional knowledge, human rights,
and an individual's continuing right to use tradition-based practices and works
38
when such individual becomes a member of the diaspora remains unsettled.
132. The Iroquois Today, http://www.iroquoismuseum.org/iroquois.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2009).
133. Such conflicts may even arise where tribes no longer have a single organized governing
structure, or where the group in question has not yet authorized any particular organization to deal
with requests to utilize traditional knowledge. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 112, at 119-25 (detailing
difficulties that arose when conflicting organizations claimed exclusive rights to authorize
ethnobotanical studies of Maya).
134. TCE 2004 Core Principles,supra note 113, at Annex II, 3. While the focus of this Article is
the role of traditional knowledge protection as a method for valuing generational innovation, such
protection also serves a valuable role in helping indigenous peoples to maintain their culture in the
face of modernity. See BROWN, supra note 112, at 234-42 (discussing distinction between goals of
providing wider intellectual property protection and protecting indigenous culture); Rosemary J.
Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Community Traditional Knowledge in
InternationalLaw, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275, 279 (2001) (stating that supporting and encouraging
traditional knowledge leads to "revitalization of local languages" and greater biodiversity).
135. Thus, for example, in Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, the creator of the Morning
Star Pole at issue in that case was subjected to "considerable criticism" for violating tribal rules
governing the commercial use of such poles. (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481, 1 21.
136. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27(1), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
137. See, e.g., Hefer, supra note 116, at 49 (stating intellectual property protections under second
clause of Declaration's Article 27 are fundamental); Yu, supra note 116, at 1071-73 (discussing
conflicting views about and internal tensions of rights included in Article 27).
138. See, e.g., Long, supra note 112, at 326 (raising several unanswered questions regarding
relationship between various types of knowledge); see also Doris Estelle Long, Address at the
Association for the Study of Law, Culture and Humanities 9th Annual Conference in Syracuse:
Cultural Rights and the Diaspora: A Proposal (Mar. 17, 2006) (transcript on file with the author)
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5. Given the diverse potential claimants to the "ownership' 1 39 of traditional
knowledge, what processes should resolve disputes over authorization or
compensation? While TRIPS requires enforcement of intellectual property
rights through civil processes, 140 the cultural and spiritual issues raised by
traditional knowledge disputes may require mediation or some process of
conciliation to resolve them. Professor Danielle Conway-Jones has observed,
Western property ownership confers three basic rights: to possess and
enjoy, to alienate, and to destroy. Those rights assume private,
individual ownership, and the result of such ownership notions is a
view of land and personal property as subject to private, individual
control. The Western property model does not accommodate the
concept of a reciprocal relationship with the land or other property or
4
a concept of communal ownership of goods and resources.' '
The communal, spiritual nature of this relationship requires dispute resolution
processes that honor this unique relationship. As opposed to traditional
litigation-based processes for intellectual property rights, 142 we may need to
integrate human-rights-based processes that more accurately reflect the nature
143
of the rights at issue.
(discussing whether individual who is no longer subject to minority or indigenous group's control is
entitled to practice that group's cultural traditions).
139. See Long, supra note 112, at 324 (contrasting individualistic and group ownership). I use the
term "ownership" advisedly. As Erica-Irene Daes recognized,
[I]ndigenous peoples do not view their heritage in terms of property at all - that is,
something which has an owner and is used for the purpose of extracting economic benefits but in terms of community and individual responsibility. Possessing a song, story or other
medicinal knowledge carries with it certain responsibilities to show respect to and maintain a
reciprocal relationship with the human beings, animals, plants and places with which the
song, story or medicine is connected. For indigenous peoples, heritage is a bundle of
relationships, rather than a bundle of economic rights.... To sell it is necessarily to bring the
relationship to an end.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of
Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples:
Study on the Protectionof the Culturaland Intellectual Propertyof Indigenous Peoples, 1 26, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.211993/28 (July 28, 1993) (prepared by Erica-Irene Daes) [hereinafter Study Indigenous
Cult. Intell. Prop.].
140. See TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 41-61 (detailing enforcement procedures).
141. Danielle Conway-Jones, Safeguarding Hawaiian Traditional Knowledge and Cultural
Heritage:Supporting the Right to Self-Determinationand Preventingthe Co-modification of Culture, 48
How. L.J. 737,746 n.19 (2005).
142. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 41-61 (establishing minimum procedural protections for
intellectual property, including availability of civil and criminal processes).
143. This human-rights-based process would necessarily include within it consideration of
indigenous dispute resolution processes. See, e.g., Riley, supra note 130, at 86-91 (noting problem with
use of Western legal systems and encouraging use of tribal law instead). The use of such processes is
supported by the human rights overlay for the protection of traditional knowledge. Article 27 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that "[e]veryone has the right freely to participate
in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its
benefits." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 136, art. 27(1); see also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 27, U.N. Doc. AJ6316 (Dec. 16,
1966), available at http:/lwww2.ohchr.orglEnglishllaw/ccpr.htm (protecting right of religious and
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There is no doubt that the issues surrounding the scope of protection to be
granted traditional knowledge are daunting. But these issues are no more
problematic than the question of the protection of "traditional" intellectual
property in today's global digital environment. They are also no less significant,
in light of the relationship between protection for traditional knowledge and
economic valuation for generational innovation.
For those who question the economic value of generational innovation,
consider the burgeoning market in counterfeit indigenous works, 144 or the role
that biopiracy plays in pharmacochemical innovations. 145 Yet without a legal
protection system, the generational innovation of indigenous cultures remains
economically undervalued.
I do not mean to suggest that the protection of traditional knowledge is only
about the extent of compensation owed to indigenous holders for the
exploitation of their knowledge and works. To the contrary, there are significant
portions of traditional knowledge, and particularly TCEs, where the holders of
such cultural expressions are seeking protection against any form of exploitation.
This excluded knowledge relates to sacred works. 146 Its protection bears no
relationship to the encouragement or valuation of innovation, nor are the works
covered by this excluded category created in response to the same impulses that

linguistic minorities to participate in their culture, practice their religion, and speak their language);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), arts. 1, 15,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cesc
r.htm (recognizing all people have right to self-determination, to take part in cultural life, and to enjoy
benefits of scientific progress); Ninth International Conference of American States, American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 13 (May 1948), available at
http://www.cidh.orglBasicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm (recognizing every person
has right to participate in cultural life and community). Without entering into the debate over whether
this cultural participation right qualifies as a fundamental human right, see Heifer, supra note 116, at
57-61 (discussing different approaches to intersection of human rights and intellectual property
rights); Yu, supra note 116, at 1075-78 (discussing relationship between human rights and intellectual
property rights), the focus on self-determination, mediation, and collectivity that are at the heart of
dispute resolution mechanisms for human rights violations appear better suited to meeting the twin
goals of dispute resolution and respect for indigenous peoples at the heart of traditional knowledge
protection, see, e.g., Long, supra note 112, at 324-25 (discussing self-determination, self-management,
and mediation as methods to protect traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples).
144. See, e.g., Betsy J. Fowler, Preventing Counterfeit Craft Designs, in POOR PEOPLE'S
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 20, at 113, 113-14 (noting global competition to provide low price products
has caused increase in counterfeiting of artisan crafts); Riley, supra note 130, at 72-73 (noting theft of
traditional knowledge and appropriation of culture have been more widely acknowledged in recent
decades).
145. See, e.g., BOLLIER, supra note 103, at 79-84 (discussing "bioprospecting" of developing
countries

by Western entities); VANDANA SHIVA, PROTECT OR PLUNDER?: UNDERSTANDING

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 49-61 (2001) (defining and analyzing examples of biopiracy);
Schuler, supra note 72, at 161-76 (providing examples of biopiracy).
146. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 112, at 11-16 (detailing conflicts arising from publishing
photographs and details of sacred Hopi ceremonies); TERRI JANKE, OUR CULTURE, OUR FUTURE:
REPORT ON AUSTRALIAN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 19 (1998)
(describing various deculturizing uses of sacred works).
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underlay much innovative activity. 147 In addition, there are other forms of
traditional knowledge for which exploitation may be acceptable, but limitations
may be placed on the types of uses in order to maintain the cultural integrity of
the work. Thus, for example, third parties may create weavings using traditional
patterns so long as the patterns are not changed in a manner that alters their
148
cultural meaning.
One of the positive developments in the years of international debate over
traditional knowledge protection is that individual countries have begun to
provide sui generis protection for domestic traditional knowledge. Countries
such as New Zealand, Panama, and Peru, among others, have recognized that
individual groups should define which aspects of their traditional knowledge
require protection.1 49 Some countries have actually established a registration
system for traditional knowledge, in which group holders are requested to
indicate the items, practices, and processes they are either willing to license for
use or are not willing to license for any use at all.1 50 This identification process is
critical since it may provide the initial grounds of agreement on the terms under
which others may use certain selected aspects of traditional knowledge. In effect,
indigenous identification of willingly exploitable knowledge and works-the core
of generational innovation-is a critical first step in crafting a regime that
151
appropriately values local innovation.

147. I have assumed that the creation of sacred works is largely encouraged through religious
impulses that are not generally driven by economic valuation issues. That does not mean that the sale
of sacred works might not form a potential local enterprise that could form part of a program for
sustainable development. It simply means that noneconomic issues will control the creation and sale of
such works.
148. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 144, at 117-18 (citing Australian case law that recognizes
collective ownership by community and individual custodians within community who must act in best
interests of community); Eric C. Kansa, Jason Schultz & Ahrash N. Bissell, Protecting Traditional
Knowledge and Expanding Access to Scientific Data:JuxtaposingIntellectual Property Agendas via a
"Some Rights Reserved" Model, 12 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 285, 299-301 (2005) (discussing options
for customizing licenses to accommodate cultural heritage). For example, the Maori have created
three categories of authentication marks: one for those goods which are created by Maori artists; one
for works created through Maori collaboration with third parties; and a third for those works created
by non-Maori, but in a manner in keeping with Maori traditions. Toi Iho,
http//www.toiiho.com/Default.aspx?tabid=249 (last visited Feb. 27,2009).
149. See, e.g., Trade Marks Act, 2002, pt. 2, § 17(1) (N.Z.) (prohibiting trademark registration
which would likely offend "a significant portion of the community," including indigenous cultures); On
the Special Intellectual Property Regime upon Collective Rights of Indigenous Communities, for the
Protection of Their Cultural Identities and Traditional Knowledge, and Whereby Set Forth Other
Provisions, No. 20, art. 1 (2000) (Pan.) (protecting traditional knowledge and culture of indigenous
peoples); Law Introducing a Protection Regime for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples
Derived from Biological Resources, No. 27811, art. 1 (2002) (Peru) (recognizing right and power of
indigenous peoples to define their collective knowledge).
150. No. 20, art. 1, 7-9; No. 27811, art. 20; see also Leistner,supra note 128, at 92-102 (discussing
specific regulations established in Peru, Panama, Portugal, and Philippines).
151. See, e.g., Riley, supranote 130, at 131 (suggesting groups begin self-identification process for
protection under sui generis regimes). While this self-identification process is critical, registration
requirements should serve a notification purpose. Lack of registration should not presumptively
prohibit the protection of a practice or work of generational innovation.
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Registration procedures admittedly present their own problems. One of the
obvious difficulties is the honest concern that if indigenous groups register the
practices, works, and knowledge that they do not want the public to use, those
are precisely the items that end up being the first ones that third parties
152
commercialize (with or without the indigenous holders' permission).
Furthermore, such registration procedures, while in accordance with the general
practice of requiring registration for patents, 153 impose a burden on traditional
154
cultural expressions (such as folk art) that copyright law prohibits.
Despite these obvious limitations, at least a registration system, adequately
funded and supported so as to avoid any undue burden on indigenous groups,
should help begin the critical identification process. Whether traditional
knowledge holders ultimately decide to register those works for which no third
party use would be granted, such as in the case of sacred works, is less critical at
this stage than that they begin the process of deciding what precise works and
practices, if any, for which they would permit or absolutely deny exploitation
rights. Such identification obviously must be undertaken in good faith 155 and can
only be crafted by traditional knowledge holders or those they have designated
to participate in the process. Understandably, some groups will refuse to
participate in such a designation system, in part because such a system does not
adequately reflect their beliefs or their concept of knowledge, 156 or because
everything is a part of their heritage and culture and therefore deserves
157
protection against third party uses.
Participation in the process must be voluntary. The point is to properly
value generational innovation for purposes of supporting its use as part of the
effort to support sustainable development. 158 No intellectual property system
forces a creator to protect his work. 159 Neither should a traditional knowledge
152. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 112, at 13-15 (detailing Hopi concerns about unauthorized
publication of photographs of their sacred ceremonies).
153. Only inventions for which applications have been filed with the relevant domestic authority
are protectable under patent regimes. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 29 (setting conditions for patent
applications).
154. See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(2) (specifying that no formalities can be imposed
on "enjoyment" and "exercise" of rights under copyright).
155. Long, supra note 112, at 327 (warning that if laws deem everything sacred or otherwise
incapable of commercial use then workable system for traditional knowledge protection may not be
possible).
156. See Study Indigenous Cult. Intell. Prop., supra note 139, 26 (noting that indigenous peoples
do not define heritage as property); BROWN, supra note 112, at 53-54 (describing lack of
understanding of meanings of aboriginal art in Bulun Bulun case).

157. See Kaitlin Mara, Indigenous Groups Express Concerns on IP Protection of Their
Knowledge,
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
WATCH,
Mar.
3,
2008,
http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2008/03/03/indigenous-groups-express-concerns-on-ip-protection-of-their-

knowledge (detailing comments of Seneca Nation member that Western law should not protect
knowledge because West does not have right to that knowledge).
158. See, e.g., Tavana, supra note 28, at 19-20, 25 (recommending traditional knowledge and

modern scientific knowledge be integrated to advance sustainable development). See supra notes 1920 and accompanying text for a discussion of valuation, innovation, and substantial development.
159. In fact, the choice not to apply for protection effectively dedicates patented inventions and
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regime. The issue is compensation for generational innovative and creative
works that the holders of the knowledge themselves want to exploit. A voluntary
system of protection most clearly meets these needs.
IV.

THE IMPACT OF THE FAILURE TO VALUE GENERATIONAL INNOVATION

For those steeped in the history and philosophy of intellectual property
regimes, the first reaction to the demand for protection of traditional knowledge

(including works containing or reflecting TCEs) is often a rejection of any
possible protection for generational innovation. Without the creation of
something unique enough to be considered "valuable" under the present
intellectual property system, no legal protection should exist. Yet despite
Western precepts, there is value in the generational passage of knowledge and in
the perfection of that knowledge by such controlled transmission; otherwise
biopiracy and commodification of cultural intangible cultural heritage would not
be such critical issues. 160 Others contend that no protection for generational
innovation should occur because it would remove valuable information from the
public domain. 161 Labeling protection a denial of access to information, however,
simply continues a historic tradition of Western devaluation of generational
innovation. This devaluation is not merely a reflection of Western values of
individuated creativity. 162 It is a continuing exclusion from innovation protection
regimes of previously excluded voices. At the time that intellectual property
regimes were being developed and perfected in the West, the twin forces of
colonialism and racism excluded the holders of traditional knowledge from such
deliberations. 163 In a time when traditional legal regimes for innovation are
164
changing in response to the new demands of technology and globalization,
copyrighted works to the public. The clarity of the dedication of copyrighted works to the public was
arguably greater under the 1909 Copyright Act in the United States, which limited copyright
protection to works that had been federally registered. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat.
1075, 1077 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)) (excluding from protection works of public
domain, works published before act took effect and not already copyrighted in the United States, and
works published by United States government). Thus, the affirmative choice not to seek federal
registration for a copyrighted work arguably demonstrated a clearer intent to dedicate the work to the
public. Today, since no registration is required for copyright protection to attach, see 17 U.S.C. §
408(a) (indicating that obtaining registration of copyright claim is not condition of copyright
protection), lack of such registration does not contain the same clear intent to forgo legal protection
for the work in question.
160. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Western culture of
innovation.
161. See Long, supra note 112, at 621 (suggesting protection of traditional knowledge may limit
people's access to that knowledge).
162. See supra Part II for an analysis of Western precepts of innovation.
163. See Long, Curtailing Imperialism, supra note 75, at 20 (noting developed nations have set
boundaries of public domain); Bellagio Declaration (1993), reprinted in DORIS ESTELLE LONG &
ANTHONY D'AMATO, A COURSEBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1025, 1026
(2000) (contending contemporary intellectual property law protects individual creators and excludes
custodians of tribal culture, medicine, art, music, and valuable seeds).
164. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 44, arts. 11, 12 (requiring protection against
unauthorized use of copyrighted works and digital rights management information).
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there is no defensible reason for the continuing failure to protect previously
excluded voices or their creative and innovative efforts.
One of the critical issues facing developing countries today is the need for
transfer of technology from the developed countries. Article 7 of TRIPS
expressly recognizes that
[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights
conducive to social
165
and obligations.
Yet one of the results of TRIPS appears to be a continuation of an uneven
playing field in connection with wealth or technology transfer. While the
developed world continues to insist on the protection of its innovationsthrough the minimum required enforcement procedures established under
TRIPS 166-it provides no similar protection for generational innovation. Where
the developed countries have "valuable" innovation (technology), the
generational innovation of the developing world only qualifies as freely
accessible works in the public domain. There is in fact a type of technology
transfer occurring. But it is a technology transfer that flows in the wrong
direction.
Even more problematically, the continuing refusal to value the generational
innovation of developing countries in fact makes it nearly impossible for this
unequal flow of technology to be reversed. If the technology (generational
innovation) of the developing countries is free, then none of the wealth created
from its exploitation is ever transferred to them in exchange for the valuable
traditional knowledge their citizens may possess.
V.

HONORING THE UNIQUENESS OF GENERATIONAL INNOVATION

In crafting a traditional knowledge regime that effectively protects
generational innovation, there are three critical misconceptions that must be
167
avoided. The first is the misguided notion that traditional knowledge is static.
Generational innovation is worthy of protection because of the value in
preserving traditions and in transmitting those traditions across generations so
that "collaboration" occurs across time. But it is not static. No tradition based on
a living culture can be static because such traditions do not exist in a static
environment. Culture has always changed in response to a variety of factors,
including history, ecology, politics, and culture. Generational innovation, with its

165. TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 7.
166. See id. arts. 41-61 (establishing minimum procedural requirements for "effective"
enforcement of intellectual property rights).
167. See U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Africa, Why Industrial Revolution Missed Africa: A
"Traditional Knowledge" Perspective, 12, U.N. Doc. ECA/ESPD/WPS/O1/02 (2002) (prepared by
Hilary Nwokeabia) (noting traditional knowledge is sometimes interpreted as being static).
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anchor in cultural identifiability, 168 necessarily relies upon knowledge, works,
and practices that may (and most likely will) change over time. Consequently,
traditional knowledge protection should not reify tradition for the sake of
reification. To the contrary, the benefit of a traditional knowledge regime is the
grant to holders of the right to control and exploit those changes that they desire
to exploit.
The second critical misconception is that authentication systems fulfill the
needs of indigenous innovators for protection. While authentication undoubtedly
plays a role in the commercial exploitation of some traditions, 169 the goal of
generational innovation is not merely to assure that only identifiably authentic
knowledge was used in the creation of the good or service in question. While
authentication can serve a useful purpose, enhancing the value of brands used on
truly unique goods, 170 such authentication limits do not adequately address the
valuation goals of protecting generational innovation. Such innovation should
not be protected simply because it is authenticated as having been based on the
traditions of a particular tribe. It should be protected for the same reason that
patented inventions are protected-because as a whole they represent valuable
innovation.
Finally, when crafting a rational traditional knowledge regime designed to
recognize the value of generational innovation, the unique nature of the holders
of such knowledge must be acknowledged. If traditional knowledge is collective
and cultural in nature, then the rights of the diaspora must be considered in
crafting any such regime. Failure to do so will only lead to future, and potentially
unnecessary, conflict.
CONCLUSION

Protection of "generational" innovation could provide a strong tool for
wealth transfer, making developing nations active participants in their own
sustainable development. Such generational innovation, however, remains
undervalued since it falls outside the Western norms for protectable innovation
represented by the imperfect measure of intellectual property regimes. This
undervaluation has denied developing and least-developed countries a right of
compensation for local innovation, contributing to the continuing imbalance in
economic development. Worse, it has actually contributed to a backwards flow
of technology transfer as developed countries use the generational innovation of
their developing neighbors without compensation. Recognizing a broader

168. Only works attributable to a particular culture qualify for the heightened protection of a
traditional knowledge regime. See, e.g., Michael Hassemer, Genetic Resources, in INDIGENOUS
HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 151, 164 (noting that current legal
protection applies in limited circumstances because much traditional knowledge lacks requisite
novelty).
169. See SCAFIDI, supra note 55, at 63-66 (describing importance of authentication in different
societies as means to identify source).
170. See Long, Is Fame All There Is?, supra note 27 (manuscript at 28-29) (noting global value of
authentication marks on unique goods cannot be challenged).
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definition of compensable innovation that covers non-Western innovative
norms-including recognition of the economic value of intergenerational
collaboration, collective "ownership," and the perfection of information through
controlled transmission across generations-would allow generational
innovators the ability to participate as equal partners in emerging knowledgebased industries. More significantly, establishing a rational system of protection
for traditional knowledge that supports generational innovation, while honoring
the unique relationship of traditional knowledge to its holders, would bring
social justice back into the issue of innovation protection. As we remake
innovation systems in response to the changes demanded by the global digital
marketplace, rational protection for traditional knowledge must be a part of that
change if we are to achieve equitable, sustainable values for innovative activity in
the twenty-first century.

HeinOnline -- 81 Temp. L. Rev. 543 2008

544

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

HeinOnline -- 81 Temp. L. Rev. 544 2008

[Vol. 81

